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Abstract. We present the concept of a disjunctive basis as a generic framework for normal
forms in modal logic based on coalgebra. Disjunctive bases were defined in previous work
on completeness for modal fixpoint logics, where they played a central role in the proof of a
generic completeness theorem for coalgebraic mu-calculi. Believing the concept has a much
wider significance, here we investigate it more thoroughly in its own right. We show that the
presence of a disjunctive basis at the “one-step” level entails a number of good properties
for a coalgebraic mu-calculus, in particular, a simulation theorem showing that every
alternating automaton can be transformed into an equivalent nondeterministic one. Based
on this, we prove a Lyndon theorem for the full fixpoint logic, its fixpoint-free fragment
and its one-step fragment, a Uniform Interpolation result, for both the full mu-calculus
and its fixpoint-free fragment, and a Janin-Walukiewicz-style characterization theorem for
the mu-calculus under slightly stronger assumptions.
We also raise the questions, when a disjunctive basis exists, and how disjunctive bases
are related to Moss’ coalgebraic “nabla” modalities. Nabla formulas provide disjunctive
bases for many coalgebraic modal logics, but there are cases where disjunctive bases give
useful normal forms even when nabla formulas fail to do so, our prime example being graded
modal logic. We also show that disjunctive bases are preserved by forming sums, products
and compositions of coalgebraic modal logics, providing tools for modular construction
of modal logics admitting disjunctive bases. Finally, we consider the problem of giving a
category-theoretic formulation of disjunctive bases, and provide a partial solution.
1. Introduction
The topic of this paper connects modal µ-calculi, coalgebra and automata. The connection
between the modal µ-calculus, as introduced by Kozen [20], and automata running on
infinite objects, is standard [15]. Many of the most fundamental results about the modal
µ-calculus have been proved by making use of this connection, including completeness of
Kozen’s axiom system [37], and model theoretic results like expressive completeness [19],
uniform interpolation and a Lyndon theorem [6].
Key words and phrases: Modal logic, fixpoint logic, automata, coalgebra, graded modal logic, Lyndon
theorem, uniform interpolation, expressive completeness.
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The standard modal µ-calculus was generalized to a generic, coalgebraic modal µ-
calculi [35], of which the modal basis was provided by Moss’ original coalgebraic modality [27],
now known as the nabla modality. From a meta-logical perspective, Moss’ nabla logics and
their fixpoint extensions are wonderfully well-behaved. For example, a generic completeness
theorem for nabla logics by a uniform system of axioms was established [21], and this was
recently extended to the fixpoint extension of the finitary Moss logic [11]. Most importantly,
the automata corresponding to the fixpoint extension of Moss’ finitary nabla logic always
enjoy a simulation theorem, allowing arbitrary coalgebraic automata to be simulated by non-
deterministic ones; this goes back to the work of Janin & Walukiewicz on µ-automata [18].
The simulation theorem provides a very strong normal form for these logics, and plays an
important role in the proofs of several results for coalgebraic fixpoint logics.
The downside of this approach is that the nabla modality is rather non-standard, and
understanding what concrete formulas actually say is not always easy. For this reason,
another approach to coalgebraic modal logic has become popular, based on so called predicate
liftings. This approach, going back to the work of Pattinson [31], provides a much more
familiar syntax in concrete applications, but can still be elegantly formulated at the level of
generality and abstraction that makes the coalgebraic approach to modal logic attractive in
the first place.1 Coalgebraic µ-calculi have also been developed as extensions of the predicate
liftings based languages [3], and the resulting logics are very well behaved: for example,
good complexity results were obtained in op. cit. Again, the connection between formulas
and automata can be formulated in this setting [13], but a central piece is now missing: so
far, no simulation theorem has been established for logics based on predicate liftings. In
fact, it is not trivial even to define what a non-deterministic automaton is in this setting.
This problem turned up in recent work [8], by ourselves together with Seifan, where we
extended our earlier completeness result for Moss-style fixpoint logics [11] to the predicate
liftings setting. Our solution was to introduce the concept of a disjunctive basis, which
formalizes in a compact way the minimal requirements that a collection of predicate liftings
Λ must meet in order for the class of corresponding Λ-automata to admit a simulation
theorem. Our aim in the present paper is to follow up on this conceptual contribution,
which we believe is of much wider significance besides providing a tool to prove completeness
results.
Exemplifying this, we shall explore some of the applications of our coalgebraic simulation
theorem. Some of these transfer known results for nabla based fixpoint logics to the predicate
liftings setting; for example, we show that a linear-size model property holds for our non-
deterministic automata (or “disjunctive” automata as we will call them), following [35].
We also show that uniform interpolation results hold for coalgebraic fixpoint logics in the
presence of a disjunctive basis, which was proved for the Moss-style languages in [26]. We
prove a Lyndon theorem for coalgebraic fixpoint logics, generalizing a result for the standard
modal µ-calculus proved in [6]: a formula is monotone in one of its variables if and only if it
is equivalent to one in which the variable appears positively. We also prove an explicitly one-
step version of this last result, which we believe has some practical interest for modal fixpoint
logics: It is used to show that, given an expressively complete set of monotone predicate
liftings, its associated µ-calculus has the same expressive power as the full µ-calculus based
on the collection of all monotone predicate liftings. We also prove a Janin-Walukiewicz
style characterization theorem for coalgebraic µ-calculi admitting slightly stronger form of
1For a comparison between the two approaches, see [24].
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disjunctive bases, continuing the line of work initiated in [10, 9]. Finally, we show that the
sum, product and composition of two modal logics that admit a disjunctive bases also admit
a disjunctive basis, thus providing a tool for modular construction of logics to which our
results apply.
Next to proving these results, we compare the notion of a disjunctive basis to the
nabla based approach to coalgebraic fixpoint logics. The connection will be highlighted
in Section 9 where we discuss disjunctive predicate liftings via the Yoneda lemma: here
the Barr lifting of the ambient functor (on which the semantics of nabla modalities are
based) comes into the picture naturally. However, this is not to say that disjunctive bases
are just “nablas in disguise”: it is a fundamental concept, formulated specifically to suit
the approach to coalgebraic modal logics via predicate liftings, rather than nabla based
languages. Furthermore, in cases where these two approaches to coalgebraic logics are not
equivalent, disjunctive bases may be available even when nabla formulas fail to provide them.
We shall see that there are several concrete and natural examples of this. A particularly
interesting specimen is graded modal logic, which adds counting modalities to standard
modal logic. While we will see that the standard nabla formulas of this language do not
provide a disjunctive basis, nevertheless a disjunctive basis for graded modal logic does exist.
Conference version: This article is an extended version of a paper [12] presented in
Ljubljana at the 2017 conference on Algebra and Coalgebra in Computer Science (CALCO
2017). Besides the material presented there, we have provided more detailed proofs, new
examples and some additional results: our Janin-Walukiewicz theorem and the results
on modular construction of logics admitting disjunctive bases via products, sums and
compositions.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basics of coalgebraic logic. We assume that the reader is familiar with coalgebra,
coalgebraic modal logic and the basic theory of automata operating on infinite objects. The
aim of this section is merely to fix some definitions and notations on notions related to
coalgebraic modal logic. In an appendix to this paper we provide some basic definitions
related to the theory of infinite parity games — we shall need such games for our results on
coalgebraic modal fixpoint logics.
First of all, throughout this paper we will use the letter T to denote an arbitrary set
functor, that is, a covariant endofunctor on the category Set having sets as objects and
functions as arrows. For notational convenience we sometimes assume that T preserves
inclusions; our arguments can easily be adapted to the more general case. Functors of
coalgebraic interest include the identity functor Id, the powerset functor P, the monotone
neighborhood functor M and the (finitary) bag functor B (where BS is the collection of
weight functions σ : S → ω with finite support). We also need the contravariant powerset
functor P˘.
Definition 2.1. A T-coalgebra is a pair S = (S, σ) where S is a set of objects called states
or points and σ : S → TS is the transition or coalgebra map of S. A pointed T-coalgebra is
a pair (S, s) consisting of a T-coalgebra and a state s ∈ S. We call a function f : S′ → S a
coalgebra homomorphism from (S′, σ′) to (S, σ) if σ ◦ f = Tf ◦ σ′, and write (S′, s′)→ (S, s)
if there is such a coalgebra morphism mapping s′ to s.
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Throughout the paper we fix an (unnamed) countable supply of propositional letters
(or variables), of which we often single out a finite subset X.
Definition 2.2. With X a set of proposition letters, a T-model over X is a pair (S, V )
consisting of a T-coalgebra S = (S, σ) and a X-valuation V on S, that is, a function
V : X → PS. The marking associated with V is the transpose map V [ : S → PX given by
V [(s) := {p ∈ X | s ∈ V (p)}. Thus the pair (S, V ) induces a TX-coalgebra (S, (V [, σ)), where
TX is the set functor PX× T.
Given T-models S,S′, a map f : S → S′ is called a T-model homomorphism if it
is a TX-coalgebra homomorphism for the induced TX-coalgebras, i.e., it is a T-coalgebra
homomorphism that preserves the truth values of all propositional variables. Pointed T-
models (S, s) and (S′, s′) are said to be behaviorally equivalent, written (S, s) ' (S′, s′), if
there is a pointed T-model (S′′, s′′) and T-model homomorphisms f : S→ S′′ and f ′ : S′ → S′′
such that f(s) = f ′(s′).
We will mainly follow the approach in coalgebraic modal logic where modalities are
associated (or even identified) with finitary predicate liftings.
Definition 2.3. A predicate lifting of arity n is a natural transformation λ : P˘n ⇒ P˘T.
Such a predicate lifting is monotone if for every set S, the map λS : (PS)
n → PTS preserves
the subset order in each coordinate. The induced predicate lifting λ∂ : Pn ⇒ PT, given by
λ∂S(X1, . . . , Xn) := TS \ λS(S \X1, . . . , S \X1), is called the (Boolean) dual of λ.
Definition 2.4. A monotone modal signature, or briefly: signature for T is a set Λ of
monotone predicate liftings for T, which is closed under taking boolean duals.
In this paper we will study coalgebraic modal logic with and without fixpoint operators.
Given a signature Λ, the formulas of the coalgebraic µ-calculus µMLΛ are given by the
following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | ϕ0 ∨ ϕ1 | ♥λ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) | µq.ϕ′
where p and q are propositional variables, λ ∈ Λ has arity n, and the application of the
fixpoint operator µq is under the proviso that all occurrences of q in ϕ′ are positive (i.e.,
under an even number of negations). We let MLΛ denote the fixpoint-free fragment of µMLΛ,
i.e., the “basic” coalgebraic modal logic of the signature Λ. We let µMLΛ(X) denote the set
of µMLΛ-formulas taking free variables from X, and define the notation MLΛ(X) similarly.
Formulas of such coalgebraic µ-calculi are interpreted in coalgebraic models, as follows.
Let S = (S, σ, V ) be a T-model over a set X of proposition letters. By induction on the
complexity of formulas, we define a meaning function [[·]]S : µMLΛ(X)→ PS, together with an
associated satisfaction relation  ⊆ S × µMLΛ(X) given by S, s  ϕ iff s ∈ [[ϕ]]S. All clauses
of this definition are standard; for instance, the one for the modality ♥λ is given by
S, s  ♥λ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) if σ(s) ∈ λS([[ϕ1]]S, . . . , [[ϕn]]S). (2.1)
For the least fixpoint operator we apply the standard description of least fixpoints of
monotone maps from the Knaster-Tarski theorem and take
[[µx.ϕ]]S :=
⋂{
U ∈ PS | [[ϕ]](S,σ,V [x 7→U ]) ⊆ U},
where V [x 7→ U ] is given by V [x 7→ U ](x) := U while V [x 7→ U ](p) := V (p) for p 6= x. A
formula ϕ is said to be monotone in a variable p if, for every T-model S = (S, σ, V ) and all
sets Z1 ⊆ Z2 ⊆ S, we have [[ϕ]](S,σ,V [p7→Z1]) ⊆ [[ϕ]](S,σ,V [p 7→Z2]).
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2.2. Examples. There are many well-known examples of modal logics that can be presented
as coalgebraic modal logics where the modalities correspond to predicate liftings for the
relevant functor. We shall not attempt to provide a complete list here, but we provide a few
basic examples that will be helpful in what follows.
Next-time modality. Probably the simplest example of a non-trivial modality that can be
described as a predicate lifting is the “next-time” operator of linear temporal logic. The
natural way to present models of LTL coalgebraically is to take the coalgebraic type functor
to be Id, the identity functor on the category of sets. Coalgebras (S, σ) for this functor just
provide maps σ : S → S, which can be thought of as providing the “next-state” function for
a discrete linear flow of time.
The identity functor has a unary predicate lifting © : P˘ → P˘: the identity natural
transformation defined by ©S : Z 7→ Z for Z ⊆ S. A little thought shows that the evaluation
of formulas ©ϕ in a model turns out as expected:
S, s  ©ϕ iff S, σ(s)  ϕ.
The lifting © is monotone and dual to itself, so ΣId = {©} is a modal signature for the
identity functor. The language µMLΛ induced by this signature is known as the linear-time
µ-calculus.
Basic modal logic. Kripke frames for modal logic are coalgebras for the covariant powerset
functor P, or rather can be represented equivalently as such: a binary relation R ⊆ S × S
of a frame (S,R) can be identified with the map R[−] : S → PS sending each point in S
to its set of R-successors. The usual Kripkean modalities 2 and 3 come out as predicate
liftings for P, by setting 2S(Z) = {Z ′ ⊆ S | Z ′ ⊆ Z} and 3S(Z) = {Z ′ ⊆ S | Z ∩ Z ′ 6= ∅}.
Unfolding the definitions we see that the naturality condition for the box modality 2 says
that for all f : S → S′ and Z ⊆ S, Z ′ ⊆ S′, we have:
f [Z] ⊆ Z ′ ⇐⇒ Z ⊆ f−1[Z ′].
This is the familiar adjunction between direct and inverse image. The semantics of modal
formulas comes out as expected: given a Kripke model (S,R, V ) represented as a P-model
S, we have S, s  2ϕ if and only if S, t  ϕ for every R-successor t of s. For the signature
ΣP = {2,3}, the language µMLΣP is the (standard) modal µ-calculus.
Monotone modal logic. Monotone modal logic generalizes normal modal logic by dropping the
constraint that the box modality should commute with conjunctions: 2(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇔ 2ϕ ∧2ψ.
Semantics for monotone modal logic is given by coalgebras for the monotone neighborhood
functor M, which is the sub-functor of the functor P˘ ◦ P˘ defined by setting:
MS = {F ⊆ P˘S | Z ∈ F & Z ⊆ Z ′ ⇒ Z ′ ∈ F}
The lifting 2 : P˘→ P˘ ◦M is defined by setting F ∈ 2S(Z) iff Z ∈ F . The dual lifting 3 is
defined by setting F ∈ 3S(Z) iff, for all Z ′ ∈ F , Z ∩ Z ′ 6= ∅.
Monotone modal logic can be seen as a “base logic” for modal logics without distribution
of the box over conjunctions, with varying interpretations, much as the modal logic K can
be seen as the most basic normal modal logic. Examples where such modalities appear are
alternating-time temporal logic [1] and Parikh’s dynamic game logic [30]. For ΣM = {2,3},
the language µMLΣM is known as the monotone µ-calculus. It stands in a similar relationship
to alternating-time logic and game logic as the modal µ-calculus does to CTL and PDL.
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Graded modal logic. Graded modal logic extends basic modal logic with counting modalities
3kϕ and 2kϕ. These modalities, interpreted on Kripke models, are interpreted as “at least
k successors satisfy ϕ” and “there are less than k successors that do not satisfy ϕ”. It is
often convenient to use a slight generalization of Kripke semantics, where successors of a
state are assigned “weights” from ω. Such models are based on B-coalgebras, where the
“bags” functor B assigns to a set S the set BS of maps f : S → ω such that f(s) = 0 for
all but finitely many s ∈ S. Given a map h : S → S′ and f ∈ BS, the map f ′ = Bh(f) is
defined by:
f ′(s′) =
∑
h(s)=s′
f(s)
The functor B comes with an infinite supply of predicate liftings k and k — one pair for
each k ∈ ω — given by:
kS : U 7→
{
σ ∈ BS |∑u∈U σ(u) ≥ k}
kS : U 7→ {σ ∈ BS |
∑
u6∈U σ(u) < k
}
.
Over Kripke models, which can be identified with B-models (S, σ, V ) in which σ(s)(v) ∈ {0, 1}
for all s, v ∈ S, it is not hard to see that the formulas 3kϕ and 2kϕ get their expected
meanings. For ΣB = {k | k ∈ ω} ∪ {k | k ∈ ω}, the language µMLΣB is known as the graded
µ-calculus.
2.3. One-step logic and one-step models. A pivotal role in our approach is filled by
the one-step versions of coalgebraic logics. The one-step perspective on coalgebraic modal
logics, developed by a number of authors over several papers [4, 31, 33, 34], has been key to
proving some central results about such logics and their fixpoint extensions. In particular, it
is instrumental to the theory of coalgebraic automata. Indeed our main contribution here
— the concept of disjunctive bases — takes place on the one-step level. We do not assume
that the reader is familiar with the framework of one-step logics, and give a self-contained
introduction here.
We begin with a formal definition.
Definition 2.5. Given a signature Λ and a set A of variables, we define the set Bool(A) of
boolean formulas over A and the set 1MLΛ(A) of one-step Λ-formulas over A, by the following
grammars:
Bool(A) 3 pi ::= a | ⊥ | > | pi ∨ pi | pi ∧ pi | ¬pi
1MLΛ(A) 3 α ::= ♥λpi | ⊥ | > | α ∨ α | α ∧ α | ¬α
where a ∈ A, λ ∈ Λ and pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) is a tuple of formulas in Bool(A) of the same
length as the arity of λ. We will denote the positive (negation-free) fragments of Bool(A)
and 1MLΛ(A) as, respectively, Latt(A) and 1ML
+
Λ(A):
Latt(A) 3 pi ::= a | ⊥ | > | pi ∨ pi | pi ∧ pi
1ML+Λ(A) 3 α ::= ♥λpi | ⊥ | > | α ∨ α | α ∧ α
We shall often make use of substitutions: given a finite set A, let ∨A : PA→ Latt(A)
be the map sending B to
∨
B, and let ∧A : PA→ Latt(A) be the map sending B to
∧
B,
and given sets A,B let θA,B : A×B → Bool(A ∪B) be defined by mapping (a, b) to a ∧ b.
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We need a number of properties of modal signatures, formulated in terms of the
corresponding one-step logics. The first is fairly standard: expressive completeness of a
modal signature Λ means that every modality that makes sense for the functor — formally,
every predicate lifting — can be expressed in terms of modalities in Λ.
Definition 2.6. A monotone modal signature Λ for T is expressively complete if, for every
n-place predicate lifting λ (not necessarily in Λ) and for all variables a1, . . . , an there is a
formula α ∈ 1MLΛ({a1, . . . , an}) which is equivalent to ♥λa.
We will also be interested in the following variant of expressive completeness:
Definition 2.7. We say that Λ is Lyndon complete if, for every monotone n-place pred-
icate lifting λ and variables a1, . . . , an, there is a positive formula α ∈ 1ML+Λ({a1, . . . , an})
equivalent to ♥λa.
We now turn to the semantics of one-step formulas, using so-called one-step models.
Definition 2.8. A one-step T-frame is a pair (S, σ) with σ ∈ TS, i.e., an object in the
category E(T) of elements of T. Similarly a one-step T-model over a set A of variables is a
triple (S, σ,m) such that (S, σ) is a one-step T-frame and m : S → PA is an A-marking on
S.
A morphism f : (S, σ) → (S′, σ′) is a morphism in E(T), that is, a map from S
to S′ such that Tf(σ) = σ′. The map f is said to be a morphism of one-step models
f : (S, σ,m)→ (S′, σ′,m′) if, in addition, m = m′ ◦ f .
Given a one-step model (S, σ,m), we define the 0-step interpretation [[pi]]0m ⊆ S of
pi ∈ Bool(A) by the obvious induction: [[a]]0m := {v ∈ S | a ∈ m(v)}, [[>]]0m := S, [[⊥]]0m := ∅,
while we use standard clauses for ∧,∨ and ¬. Similarly, the one-step interpretation [[α]]1m of
α ∈ 1MLΛ(A) is defined as a subset of TS, with [[♥λ(pi1, . . . , pin)]]1m := λS([[pi1]]0m, . . . , [[pin]]0m),
and again standard clauses apply to ⊥,>,∧,∨ and ¬. Given a one-step model (S, σ,m), we
write S, σ,m 1 α for σ ∈ [[α]]1m. Notions like one-step satisfiability, validity and equivalence
are defined and denoted in the obvious way; in particular, we use ≡1 to denote the equivalence
of one-step formulas.
For future reference we mention the following two results, the first of which states that
the truth of one-step formulas is invariant under one-step morphisms.
Proposition 2.1. Let f : (S′, σ′,m′)→ (S, σ,m) be a morphism of one-step models over A.
Then for every formula α ∈ 1MLΛ(A) we have
S′, σ′,m′ 1 α iff S, σ,m 1 α.
The second proposition is a standard observation about the semantic counterpart of the
syntactic notion of substitution.
Proposition 2.2. Let (S, σ,m) be a one-step model over A, and let σ : B → Bool(A) be a
substitution. Then for every formula α ∈ 1MLΛ(B) we have
S, σ,mσ 1 α iff S, σ,m 1 α[σ],
where mσ is the B-marking given by mσ(b) := [[σb]]
0
m.
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2.4. Graph games. For readers unfamiliar with the theory of infinite games, we provide
some of the basic definitions here, referring to [15] for a survey.
Definition 2.9. A board game is a tuple G = (G∃, G∀, E,W ) where G∃ and G∀ are disjoint
sets, and, with G := G∃ ∪G∀ denoting the board of the game, the binary relation E ⊆ G2
encodes the moves that are admissible to the respective players, and W ⊆ Gω denotes the
winning condition of the game. In a parity game, the winning condition is determined by a
parity map Ω : G→ ω with finite range, in the sense that the set WΩ is given as the set of
G-streams ρ ∈ Gω such that the maximum value occurring infinitely often in the stream
(Ωρi)i∈ω is even.
Elements of G∃ and G∀ are called positions for the players ∃ and ∀, respectively; given
a position p for player Π ∈ {∃, ∀}, the set E[p] denotes the set of moves that are legitimate
or admissible to Π at p. In case E[p] = ∅ we say that player Π gets stuck at p.
An initialized board game is a pair consisting of a board game G and a initial position
p, usually denoted as G@p.
Definition 2.10. A match of a graph game G = (G∃, G∀, E,W ) is nothing but a (finite or
infinite) path through the graph (G,E). Such a match ρ is called partial if it is finite and
E[lastρ] 6= ∅, and full otherwise. We let PMΠ denote the collection of partial matches ρ
ending in a position last(ρ) ∈ GΠ, and define PMΠ@p as the set of partial matches in PMΠ
starting at position p.
The winner of a full match ρ is determined as follows. If ρ is finite, then by definition
one of the two players got stuck at the position last(ρ), and so this player looses ρ, while the
opponent wins. If ρ is infinite, we declare its winner to be ∃ if ρ ∈W , and ∀ otherwise.
Definition 2.11. A strategy for a player Π ∈ {∃,∀} is a map χ : PMΠ → G. A strategy
is positional if it only depends on the last position of a partial match, i.e., if χ(ρ) = χ(ρ′)
whenever last(ρ) = last(ρ′); such a strategy can and will be presented as a map χ : GΠ → G.
A match ρ = (pi)i<κ is guided by a Π-strategy χ if χ(p0p1 . . . pn−1) = pn for all n < κ
such that p0 . . . pn−1 ∈ PMΠ (that is, pn−1 ∈ GΠ). Given a strategy f , we say that a position
p is f -reachable if p occurs on some f -guided partial match. A Π-strategy χ is legitimate
in G@p if the moves that it prescribes to χ-guided partial matches in PMΠ@p are always
admissible to Π, and winning for Π in G@p if in addition all χ-guided full matches starting
at p are won by Π.
A position p is a winning position for player Π ∈ {∃,∀} if Π has a winning strategy in
the game G@p; the set of these positions is denoted as WinΠ. The game G = (G∃, G∀, E,W )
is determined if every position is winning for either ∃ or ∀.
When defining a strategy χ for one of the players in a board game, we will often confine
ourselves to defining χ for partial matches that are themselves guided by χ. The following
fact, independently due to Emerson & Jutla [7] and Mostowski [28], will be quite useful to
us.
Fact 2.12 (Positional Determinacy). Let G = (G∃, G∀, E,W ) be a graph game. If W is
given by a parity condition, then G is determined, and both players have positional winning
strategies.
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2.5. Automata. Given a state s in a coalgebra σ : S → TS, consider the one-step frame
(S, σ(s)) — this is the local “window” into the structure of the coalgebra that is directly
visible from s. The main function of one-step models for our purposes here is to provide a
neat framework for automata running on T-models. The idea is the following: at any stage
in the run of an automaton A on a model S = (S, σ, V ), the automaton reads some point s
in S and takes the set V [(s) ⊆ X, consisting of those propositional variables that are true at
s, as input. Next the automaton decides whether to continue the computation or to reject.
To decide this, the automaton checks the directly visible part of the model S at s, modelled
as the one-step frame σ(s), and looks for an admissible way to continue the computation one
step further. The ways in which the run may continue are constrained by a one-step formula
α, which depends on the current state a of the automaton and the last input V [(s) read,
and is built up using states of the automaton as variables. The run continues if a marking m
can be found that makes α true in the one-step model (S, σ(s),m), and the marking m then
determines which states in S may be visited in the next stage of the run, and the possible
next states of the automaton.
Definition 2.13. A (Λ, X)-automaton, or more broadly, a coalgebra automaton, is a quadruple
(A,Θ,Ω, aI) where A is a finite set of states, with initial state aI ∈ A, Θ : A×PX→ 1ML+Λ(A)
is the transition map and Ω : A→ ω is the priority map of A.
The semantics of such an automaton is given in terms of a two-player infinite parity
game: With S = (S, σ, V ) a T-model over a set Y ⊇ X, the acceptance game A(A, S) is the
parity game given by the table below.
Position Player Admissible moves Priority
(a, s) ∈ A× S ∃ {m : S → PA | (S, σ(s),m) 1 Θ(a, X ∩ V [(s))} Ω(a)
m : S → PA ∀ {(b, t) | b ∈ m(t)} 0
We say that A accepts the pointed T-model (S, s), notation: S, s  A, if (aI , s) is a
winning position for ∃ in the acceptance game A(A,S).
The connection with coalgebraic modal logic is given by the following result.
Fact 2.14 [13]. There are effective constructions transforming a formula in µMLΛ(X) into an
equivalent (Λ, X)-automaton, and vice versa.
3. Disjunctive formulas and disjunctive bases
3.1. Disjunctive formulas. In this section, we present the main conceptual contribution
of the paper, and define disjunctive bases. We then consider a number of examples.
As a first step, we begin by presenting disjunctive formulas, originally introduced in [8],
as a class of one-step formulas for a given modal signature characterized by a model-theoretic
property, expressed in terms of the one-step semantics.
Definition 3.1. A one-step formula α ∈ 1ML+Λ(A) is called disjunctive if for every one-step
model (S, σ,m) such that S, σ,m 1 α there is a one-step frame (S′, σ′) together with a
one-step frame morphism f : (S′, σ′)→ (S, σ) and a marking m′ : S′ → PA, such that:
(1) S′, σ′,m′ 1 α;
(2) m′(s′) ⊆ m(f(s′)), for all s′ ∈ S′;
(3) |m′(s′)| ≤ 1, for all s′ ∈ S′.
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We sometimes refer to the one-step frame (S′, σ′) together with the map f as a cover of
(S, σ), and to the one-step model (S′, σ′,m′) together with the map f as a dividing cover of
(S, σ,m) for α.
The intuition behind disjunctive formulas is that, in a certain sense, they never “force”
two distinct propositional variables to be true together, i.e. any one-step model for a
disjunctive formula δ in 1ML+Λ(A) can be transformed into one in which every point satisfies
at most one propositional variable from A. Moreover, “transformed into” here does not just
mean “replaced by”: we cannot arbitrarily change the one-step model, the output of the
construction must be closely related to the one-step model that we started with.
A trivial example of a disjunctive formula is ©a for a ∈ A, where we recall that © was
the next-time modality viewed as a predicate lifting for the identity functor Id. A one-step
model for this functor is a triple S, s,m consisting of a set S, an element s ∈ S and a
marking m : S → PA. Then S, s,m 1 ©a if, and only if, a ∈ m(s). But then, no elements
in S besides s are relevant to the evaluation of ©a, and for s we can just forget about all
other variables: set m′(s) = {a} and m′(v) = ∅ for all s ∈ S \ {v}. We have S, s,m′ 1 ©a,
m′(v) ⊆ m(v) and |m′(v)| ≤ 1 for all v ∈ S.
For an example of a one-step formula that is not disjunctive, consider 2a ∧3b (where
3 and 2 are the standard modalities for Kripke structures, i.e., coalgebras for the power set
functor P). Observe that a one-step model for this functor is a triple (S, σ,m) with σ ⊆ S.
It should be obvious that for the formula 2a ∧3b to hold at such a structure, σ needs to
have an element s where a holds, while at the same time every element of σ, including s,
must satisfy b. There is no escape here: we can only have (S, σ,m) 1 2a∧3b if there is an
element s making both a and b true.
This is very different if we consider the typical disjunctive formulas for basic modal
logic, which are of the form:
3a1 ∧ · · · ∧3an ∧2(a1 ∨ · · · ∨ an)
This is often abbreviated as ∇{a1, . . . , an}. The operator ∇ is known as the cover modality,
or sometimes “nabla modality”. The formula ∇B says about a one-step model (S, σ,m)
for P, that the following “back-and-forth” conditions hold: for all s ∈ σ there is some
a ∈ B with a ∈ m(s), and conversely, for every a ∈ B there is some s ∈ σ with a ∈ m(s).
These formulas are indeed disjunctive, but less trivially so than the next-time formulas. For
example, consider the formula ∇{a, b, c}, which is true in a one-step model (S, s,m) with
S = {u, v}, m(u) = {a, b} and m(v) = {b, c}. But there is no way to simply shrink the
marking m to a dividing marking m′ so that (S, s,m) 1 ∇{a, b, c}: there are too many
pigeons and too few pigeon holes — so the obvious solution is to make more pigeon holes!
One way to do this is to “split” the points in {u, v} so that we make room for each variable
to be witnessed at a separate point. More formally, let S′ = {(u, a), (u, b), (v, b), (v, c)}
and define m′ : S′ → {a, b, c} via the projection on {a, b, c}, i.e., m′(u, a) = {a}, etc. This
one-step model satisfies ∇{a, b, c} and it has the obvious covering map h being the projection
piS on S.
The cover modality was arguably the starting point of coalgebraic modal logic. In
the seminal paper [27], Moss defined nabla modalities for all functors that preserve weak
pullback squares, generalizing the cover modality. The idea is to apply the coalgebraic type
functor T to sets of formulas Ψ and form new formulas from objects Γ in TΨ. That is, ∇Γ
counts as a formula if Ψ is a set of formulas and Γ ∈ TΨ. The semantics is given in terms of
the “Barr extension” T of the functor T, which is a relation lifting defined for R ⊆ X ×A
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{a} (u, a) piS
++ u {a, b}
{b} (u, b) piS
33
{b} (v, b) piS
++ v {b, c}
{c} (v, c) piS
33
Figure 1: The cover h : (S′,m′)→ (S,m)
by setting:
TR = {(ξ, α) ∈ TX × TA | ∃ρ ∈ TR : TpiX(ρ) = ξ & TpiA(ρ) = α}
We then evaluate the nabla modality by applying this relation lifting to the satisfaction
relation:
S, s  ∇Γ iff (σ(s),Γ) ∈ T().
In terms of one-step formulas, we would count ∇Γ as a one-step formula with variables
in A, for all Γ ∈ TBool(A). In particular, formulas of the form ∇Γ for Γ ∈ TA count as
one-step formulas.
These formulas are in fact disjunctive:
Proposition 3.1. Let T be a set functor that preserves weak pullbacks. Then every formula
of the form ∇Γ, where Γ ∈ TA, is disjunctive.
To see this, suppose that a one-step model X, ξ,m satisfies the formula ∇Γ. This means
that (ξ,Γ) ∈ TR, where R = 0 ∩ (X × A) is defined by (u, a) ∈ R iff a ∈ m(u). By
definition of the Barr extension, this means we find some ρ ∈ TR such that TpiA(ρ) = Γ and
TpiX(ρ) = ξ. But then we have our covering one-step model right in front of us already: the
triple (R, ρ, η ◦ piA) is a one-step model where η : A → PA is the singleton map a 7→ {a},
i.e., the unit of the powerset monad. The covering map is just the projection piX : R→ X.
It is a simple exercise to check that (R, ρ, η ◦ piA) 1 ∇Γ, and clearly |η(piA(u, a))| = 1 and
η(piA(u, a)) ⊆ m(u) for all (u, a) ∈ R. So we see that disjunctiveness of the nabla modalities
is not incidental: it is hardwired into their semantics.
3.2. Disjunctive bases. We now turn to a discussion of the key notion of this paper, viz.,
the disjunctive bases originating with [8]. For their definition, we recall the substitutions
∧A : B 7→
∧
B and θA,B : (a, b) 7→ a ∧ b defined in the Preliminaries. It will also be
convenient to introduce the abbrevation
A ∪× B := (A×B) ∪A ∪B
for any two sets A,B.
Definition 3.2. Let D be an assignment of a set of positive one-step formulas D(A) ⊆ 1ML+Λ(A)
for all sets of variables A. Then D is called a disjunctive basis for Λ if each formula in D(A)
is disjunctive, and the following conditions hold:
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(1) D(A) contains > and is closed under finite disjunctions (in particular, also ⊥ = ∨∅ ∈
D(A)).
(2) D is distributive over Λ: for every one-step formula of the form ♥λpi in 1ML+Λ(A) there is
a formula δ ∈ D(P(A)) such that ♥λpi ≡1 δ[∧A].
(3) D admits a binary distributive law : for any two formulas α ∈ D(A) and β ∈ D(B), there
is a formula γ ∈ D(A ∪× B) such that α ∧ β ≡1 γ[θA,B].
As a stronger version, we say that D is a uniform disjunctive basis if each one-step frame
(S, σ) has a single cover f : (S′, σ′) → (S, σ) which works for all D-formulas, in the sense
that for each δ ∈ D(A) and each marking m : S → PA with S, σ,m 1 δ there is a marking
m′ : S′ → PA such that (S′, σ′,m′) together with the map f provides a dividing cover of
(S, σ,m) for δ.
The key property of disjunctive bases is captured by the following normal form theorem,
which is easy to derive from the definition.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose D is a disjunctive basis for Λ. Then for every one-step formula
α ∈ 1ML+Λ(A) there is a formula δ ∈ D(P(A)) such that α ≡1 δ[∧A].
Note that the requirement > ∈ D(A) is needed for this proposition to hold: we have
> ∈ 1ML+Λ(A), so for the proposition to be true there has to be a formula δ ∈ D(P(A)) such
that > ≡1 δ[∧A]. Since > ∈ D(P(A)) we can take δ = > — without having > ∈ D(P(A))
there would be no guarantee in general that an appropriate formula δ can be found.
We have seen that nabla formulas are disjunctive, and we shall soon see that they provide
disjunctive bases for many modal signatures. In order for the approach of constructing
disjunctive bases via nabla formulas to work however, it is necessary that the ambient
functor T preserves weak pullbacks. This is one sense in which disjunctive bases generalize
nabla formulas: we shall soon see an example of a functor which does not preserve weak
pullbacks, but does have a signature admitting a disjunctive basis. However, we want to
stress that the main motivation behind disjunctive bases is not to “get by without weak
pullback preservation” — in fact, most natural examples of disjunctive bases we can think
of apply to functors that do preserve weak pullbacks. Rather, the point is that the existence
of a disjunctive basis is a property of modal signatures, not of functors. The choice of a
modal signature for a functor is not arbitrary, it can substantially affect the properties of
the modal languages that we get. In particular, even for functors that do preserve weak
pullbacks, we can have natural choices of modal signatures for which the nabla formulas
associated with the functor do not provide a disjunctive basis. Typically, this will happen
when the modal signature is (a) infinite, and (b) not expressively complete. An example of
this situation that will be given special attention is graded modal logic, to be presented in
the next subsection. But there are much simpler cases, as we shall see.
3.3. Examples. In this subsection we present a number of examples of modal signatures
admitting disjunctive bases, and one example of a modal signature that provably does not
admit a disjunctive basis.
3.3.1. Disjunctive bases for weak pullback preserving functors. In the previous section we
noted that disjunctive formulas generalize the Moss modalities. In many interesting cases
this suffices to find a disjunctive basis.
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Proposition 3.3. Let Λ be a signature for a weak-pullback preserving functor T. If Λ is
Lyndon complete, then it admits a disjunctive basis.
Proof. We shall use the (infinitary) nabla based logic for T as an auxiliary language. Let
1ML∞∇ (A) be defined by the grammar:
α ::= > |
∨
Φ | ∇Γ
where Φ ⊆ 1ML∞∇ (A) and Γ ∈ TA. Semantics of formulas in 1ML∞∇ (A) in a one-step model is
defined by the obvious recursion, where the interpretation of ∇Γ is as before.
We first claim that for every formula α ∈ 1ML∞∇ (A), where A = {a1, . . . , an}, there
is a monotone n-place predicate lifting λ for T such that α is equivalent to the formula
♥λ(a1, . . . , an). This follows from results in [25], together with the easy observation that
(monotone) predicate liftings are closed under arbitrary disjunctions. We can safely assume
that ♥λ(a1, . . . , an) ∈ 1ML+Λ(A) since Λ was assumed to be Lyndon complete.2
With this in mind, let D∇(A) be the set of all finite disjunctions of formulas of the
form > or of the form ♥λ(a1, . . . , an), where λ is the n-place predicate lifting associated
with some α ∈ 1ML∞∇ (A). As mentioned, all formulas of the form ∇Γ are disjunctive, and
since disjunctivity is closed under taking arbitrary disjunctions, all formulas in 1ML∞∇ (A) are
disjunctive too — hence all formulas in D∇(A) are disjunctive.
It remains to prove that D∇(A) is a basis for Λ, so we need to show that D∇(A) is
distributive over Λ and admits a binary distributive law. For the purpose of proving
distributivity over Λ it suffices to show that any formula β ∈ 1ML+Λ(A) is equivalent to a
formula α[∧A], where α ∈ 1ML∞∇ (PA). In other words we want to prove, for an arbitrary
formula β ∈ 1ML+Λ(A):
β ≡1
∨
{(∇Γ)[∧A] | Γ ∈ TPA & PA,Γ, id 1 β}, (3.1)
where id : B 7→ B denotes the canonical marking on the set PA. The notation here
may need a bit of explanation: given Γ ∈ TPA, we can apply the functor T to the map
∧A : PA → Latt(A) and apply this to Γ to obtain (T∧A)Γ ∈ TLatt(A). With this
established we define:
(∇Γ)[∧A] := ∇(T∧A)Γ.
For a proof of the left-to-right direction of (3.1), assume that S, σ,m 1 β. From
this it follows by invariance (Proposition 2.1) that PA, (Tm)σ, id 1 β, so that ∇Γ where
Γ := (Tm)σ ∈ TPA provides a candidate disjunct on the right hand side of (3.1). It remains
to show that S, σ,m 1 ∇(Tm)σ[∧A], but this is immediate by definition of the semantics
of ∇.
For the opposite direction of (3.1), let Γ ∈ TPA be such that PA,Γ, id 1 β. In order
to show that β is a one-step semantic consequence of ∇Γ[∧A], let (S, σ,m) be a one-step
model such that S, σ,m 1 ∇(T∧A)Γ. Without loss of generality we may assume that
(S, σ,m) = (PA,∆, id) for some ∆ ∈ TPA.
By the semantics of ∇ it then follows from PA,∆, id 1 ∇Γ[∧A] that (∆, (T∧A)Γ) ∈
T(0). But since (B,∧A(C)) ∈ 0 implies that C ⊆ B, we easily obtain that (Γ,∆) ∈ T(⊆).
We can now apply the following claim, the proof of which we leave as an exercise:
2Strictly speaking Lyndon completeness only guarantees there exists some formula in 1ML+Λ (A) that is
equivalent to ♥λ(a1, . . . , an), but taking care with this distinction would only complicate notation.
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Claim 1 . Let (S, σ,m) and (S′, σ′,m′) be two one-step models, and let Z ⊆ S × S′ be
a relation such that (σ, σ′) ∈ TZ, and m(s) ⊆ m′(s′), for all (s, s′) ∈ Z. Then for all
α ∈ 1ML+Λ(A):
S, σ,m 1 α implies S′, σ′,m′ 1 α.
It is easy to see that the claim is applicable to the one-step models (PA,Γ, id) and
(PA,∆, id), and the relation Z = ⊆: we already showed that (Γ,∆) ∈ T(⊆). Furthermore, if
B ⊆ B′ then trivially id(B) ⊆ id(B′). Hence it follows from PA,Γ, id 1 β that PA,∆, id 1
β.
For the binary distributive law, we leave it to the reader to check that for Γ ∈ TA and
Γ′ ∈ TB, the conjunction ∇Γ ∧∇Γ′ is equivalent to the possibly infinite disjunction of all
formulas of the form ∇Γ′′[θA,B] such that Γ′′ ∈ T(A×B), TpiA(Γ′′) = Γ and TpiB(Γ′′) = Γ′.
With this claim in place, the binary distributive law is easily established.
3.3.2. A simple example. The simplest non-trivial example of a disjunctive basis we can
think of, that is not a special case of the nabla-based approach of the previous paragraph, is
the following. Consider the functor T = Σ× Id, where Σ is a countably infinite alphabet. For
this functor, T-coalgebras are (up to unfolding) just Σ-streams, or infinite words for which
the alphabet is contained in Σ. They can be viewed as triples (S, σ1, σ2) where σ1 : S → Σ
and σ2 : S → S. A simple and reasonably natural modal signature Λ for this functor is the
following: we have one nullary modality !l for each l ∈ Σ with the interpretation: S, s  !l iff
σ1(s) = l, and we have a single one-place modality © with the interpretation S, s  ©ϕ iff
S, σ2(s)  ϕ. We can easily describe this language as a modal signature Λ for the functor T,
and it is not hard to show that Λ has a disjunctive basis consisting of the formulas !l for
l ∈ Σ and ©a for a ∈ A.
The one-step nabla formulas for T, which are of the form ∇(l, a), with (S, (l′, s),m) 1
∇(l, a) iff l′ = l and s 0 a, can easily be expressed as Λ-formulas by writing∇(l, a) := !l∧©a.
However, these formulas do not form a disjunctive basis for Λ. To see why, just consider
the set of variables A = {a}. The property of distributivity of disjunctive bases would then
require that the formula ©a should be equivalent to a finite disjunction of formulas of the
form:
!l ∧©a
where l ∈ Σ. But the formula ©a corresponds to an infinite disjunction:∨
{!l ∧©a | l ∈ Σ}
It is fairly obvious that this is not equivalent to any finitary disjunction of the required
shape. It is not hard to come up with other, similar examples.
3.3.3. Graded modal logic. A much more involved example of a modal logic that admits a
disjunctive basis which cannot be reduced to nabla formulas, is graded modal logic. The bag
functor (defined in Section 2.2) does preserve weak pullbacks, and so its Moss modalities are
disjunctive, and so the set of all monotone liftings for B does admit a disjunctive basis as an
instance of Proposition 3.3. Note, however, that the latter proposition does not apply to
graded modal logic, since its signature ΣB is not expressively complete; this was essentially
shown in [29]. It was observed in [2] that very simple formulas in the one-step language
1MLΣB are impossible to express in the (finitary) Moss language; consequently, the Moss
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modalities for the bag functor are not suitable to provide disjunctive normal forms for graded
modal logic. Still, the signature ΣB does have a disjunctive basis.
Definition 3.3. We say that a one-step model for the finite bag functor is Kripkean if all
states have multiplicity 1. Note that a Kripkean one-step model (S, σ,m) can also be seen
as a structure (in the sense of standard first-order model theory) for a first-order signature
consisting of a monadic predicate for each a ∈ A: Simply consider the pair (S, Vm), where
Vm : A → PS is the interpretation given by putting Vm(a) := {s ∈ S | a ∈ m(s)}. We
consider special basic formulas of monadic first-order logic of the form:
β(a,B) := ∃x(diff(x) ∧
∧
i∈I
ai(xi) ∧ ∀y(diff(x, y)→
∨
b∈B
b(y))),
where diff(x1, . . . , xn) abbreviates the formula diff(x1, . . . , xn) =
∧
1≤i<j≤n xi 6= xj . To be
explicit, we allow the case where a is the empty sequence , in which case we get:
β(, B) = ∀x
∨
b∈B
b(x).
It is not hard to see that any Kripkean one-step B-model (S, σ,m) satisfies:
S, σ,m 1 β(a,B) implies S, σ,m′ 1 β(a,B) for some m′ ⊆ m with Ran(m′) ⊆ P≤1A.
(3.2)
We can turn the formula β(a,B) into a modality ∇(a;B) that can be interpreted in all
one-step B-models, using the observation that every one-step B-frame (S, σ) (with σ : S → ω)
has a unique Kripkean cover (S˜, σ˜) defined by putting S˜ :=
⋃{s×σ(s) | s ∈ S}, and σ˜ ∈ BS˜
is defined by σ˜(s, i) := 1 for all s ∈ S and i ∈ σ(s) (where we view each finite ordinal as the
set of all smaller ordinals). Then we can define, for an arbitrary one-step B-model (S, σ)
S, σ,m 1 ∇(a;B) if S˜, σ˜,m ◦ piS 1 β(a,B), (3.3)
where piS is the projection map piS : S˜ → S. It is then an immediate consequence of (3.2)
that ∇(a;B) is a disjunctive formula.
Our main aim in this section is to show that the modalities ∇(a;B) provide a disjunctive
basis for the signature ΣB. As far as we know, this result is new. The hardest part in proving
it is to show that the modalities ∇(a;B) can be expressed as one-step formulas in 1ML+ΣB(A).
The reason that this is not so easy is subtle; by contrast, it is fairly straightforward to show
that formulas of the form ∇(a;B) can be expressed in 1MLΣB(A), using Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´
games, see e.g. Fontaine & Place [14]. However, a proper disjunctive basis as we have defined
it has to consist of positive formulas, and this will be crucial for applications to modal
fixpoint logics3.
Proposition 3.4. Every formula ∇(a;B) is one-step equivalent to a formula in 1ML+ΣB(A).
Our main tool in proving this proposition will be Hall’s Marriage Theorem, which can
be formulated as follows. A matching of a bi-partite graph G = (V1, V2, E) is a subset M
of E such that no two edges in M share any common vertex. M is said to cover V1 if
DomM = V1.
3The same subtlety appears in Janin & Lenzi [17], where the translation of the language DB into 1ML
+
ΣB
is required to prove that the graded µ-calculus is equivalent, over trees, to monadic second-order logic.
Proposition 3.4 in fact fills a minor gap in this proof.
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Fact 3.4 (Hall’s Marriage Theorem). Let G be a finite bi-partite graph, G = (V1, V2, E).
Then G has a matching that covers V1 iff, for all U ⊆ V1, |U | ≤ |E[U ]|, where E[U ] is the
set of vertices in V2 that are adjacent to some element of U .
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We will show this for the simple case where B is a singleton
{b}. The general case is an immediate consequence of this (consider the substitution
B 7→ ∨B).
Let a = (a1, . . . , an). Define I := {1, . . . , n}. For each subset J ⊆ I, let χJ be the
formula
χJ := 3
|J |∨
i∈J
ai ∧2n+1−|J |(
∨
i∈J
ai ∨ b),
and let γ be the conjunction
γ :=
∧
{χJ | J ⊆ I}.
What the formula χJ says about a Kripkean (finite) one-step model is that at least |J |
elements satisfy the disjunction of the set {ai | i ∈ J}, while all but at most n− |J | elements
satisfy the disjunction of the set {ai | i ∈ J} ∪ {b}. Abbreviating ∇(a;b) := ∇(a;{b}), we
claim that
γ ≡1 ∇(a;b), (3.4)
and to prove this it suffices to consider Kripkean one-step models.
It is straightforward to verify that the formula γ is a semantic one-step consequence of
∇(a;b). For the converse, consider a Kripkean one-step model (S, σ,m) in which γ is true.
Let K be an index set of size |S| −n, and disjoint from the index set I = {1, . . . , n}. Clearly
then, |I ∪K| = |I| + |K| = |S|. Furthermore, let ak := b, for all k ∈ K. To apply Hall’s
theorem, we define a bipartite graph G := (V1, V2, E) by setting V1 := I ∪K, V2 := S, and
E := {(j, s) ∈ (I ∪K)× S | aj ∈ m(s)}. Note that this graph is finite: by definition of the
bag functor only finitely many elements may have non-zero multiplicity in a one-step model,
so every Kripkean one-step model has to be finite. Hence S is finite, and so both I and K
are finite since |I ∪K| = |S|.
Claim 1 . The graph G has a matching that covers V1.
Proof of Claim We check the Hall marriage condition for an arbitrary subset H ⊆ V0. In
order to prove that the size of E[H] is greater than that of H itself, we consider the formula
χH∩I . We make a case distinction.
Case 1: H ⊆ I. Then χH∩I = χH implies 3|H|
∨
i∈H ai. This means that at least |H|
elements of S satisfy at least one variable in the set {ai | i ∈ H}. By the definition of the
graph G, this is just another way of saying that |H| ≤ |E[H]|, as required.
Case 2: H ∩K 6= ∅. Let J := H ∩ I, then the formula χH∩I = χJ implies the formula
2n+1−|J |(
∨
j∈J
aj ∨ b).
Now, if s ∈ S satisfies either b or some aj for j ∈ J , then by the construction of G we have
s ∈ E[H]. We now see that |S \ E[H]| ≤ n− |J |. Hence we get:
|E[H]| ≥ |S| − (n− |J |) = |S| − n+ |J |.
But note that H = J ∪ (H ∩K), so that we find
|H| ≤ |J |+ |H ∩K| ≤ |J |+ |K| = |J |+ (|S| − n),
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From these two inequalities it is immediate that |H| ≤ |E[H]|, as required. J
Now consider a matching M that covers V1. Since the size of the set V1 is the same as
that of V2, any matching M of G that covers V1 is (the graph of) a bijection between these
two sets. Furthermore, it easily follows that such an M restricts to a bijection between I
and a subset {s1, . . . , sn} of S such that ai ∈ m(si) for each i ∈ I, and that b ∈ m(t) for
each t /∈ {u1, . . . , un}. Hence ∇(a;b) is true in (S, σ,m), as required.
In light of this proposition, we shall continue to use the notation ∇(a;B) for the
equivalent formula in 1ML+ΣB(A) provided in the proof.
Definition 3.5. We define DB(A) by the following grammar:
δ ::= > | ∇(a;B) | δ ∨ δ
where a is a tuple of elements from A and B ⊆ A.
Theorem 3.5. The assignment DB provides a disjunctive basis for the signature ΣB.
Proof. It remains to prove that DB is distributive over ΣB, and admits a binary distributive
law. For the first part, consider the formula 3kpi ∈ 1ML+ΣB(A). Note that ∅ is a variable in
PA and that
∨{∅}[∧A] = ∧∅ = >. With this in mind, it is not hard to see that 3kpi can
be rewritten equivalently as:
3kpi =
∨
{∇(B1, . . . , Bk;{∅}) |
∧
Bi  pi, for each i}[∧A]
Here,  denotes propositional consequence between formulas in Bool(A). Next, consider the
formula 2kpi ∈ 1ML+ΣB(A). Keeping in mind that
∧
∅ = >, the reader can verify that this is
equivalent to: ∨
m<k
∇(∅, . . . ,∅︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
;{B ⊆ A |
∧
B  pi})[∧A]
To establish the binary distributive law, let δ ∈ DB(A) and δ′ ∈ DB(B). Then δ is of the
form α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn and δ′ is of the form β1 ∨ · · · ∨ βm, where each αi is either equal to > or
of the form ∇(a;A′) for some a,A′ and each βj is either equal to > or of the form ∇(b;B′)
for some b, B′. By distributing the conjunction over disjunctions, we can rewrite the formula
δ ∧ δ′ as an equivalent disjunction of formulas αi ∧ βj for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. So it
suffices to show that the required distributive law holds for conjunctions of this shape.
In the case where αi = βj = >, we have αi∧βj ≡1 >. But > ∈ D(A∪×B) and > = >[θA,B ],
so this case is done. If one and only one of αi, βj is equal to >, say αi = ∇(a;A′) and βj = >,
then:
αi ∧ βj ≡1 ∇(a;A′) ∈ D(A) ⊆ D(A ∪× B).
But ∇(a;A′)[θA,B] = ∇(a;A′), so we are done in this case as well.
Finally, the interesting case is where αi is of the form ∇(a1, . . . , ak;A′) and βj is of
the form ∇(b1, . . . , bl;B′). For this case, we need some definitions: we fix the formulas
αi = ∇(a1, . . . , ak;A′) and βj = ∇(b1, . . . , bl;B′). Let an overlap record be a subset O ⊆
{1, . . . , k}× {1, . . . , l} such that O is the graph of a bijection from some subset of {1, . . . , k}
onto some subset of {1, . . . , l}. We denote the set of such overlap records by O. Given an
overlap record O, an O-pair is a pair (c1, c2) of functions c1 : {1, . . . , k} \ pi1[O]→ B′ and
c2 : {1, . . . , l} \ pi2[O]→ A′. Finally, a case description is a triple (O, c1, c2) where O is an
overlap record and (c1, c2) is an O-pair. Note that there are finitely many case descriptions.
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Given a case description (O, c1, c2), let {1, . . . , k} \ pi1[O] = {p1, . . . , ps}, let {1, . . . , l} \
pi2[O] = {q1, . . . , qt}, and let ~O be a list of the pairs in O in some arbitrary order. Now
define the formula χ(O, c1, c2) to be:
∇((ap1 , c1(p1)), . . . , (aps , c1(ps)), (bq1 , c2(q1)), . . . , (bqt , c2(qt)), ~O ; A′ ×B′)
This is a formula in DB(A∪×B), in fact it is a formula in DB(A×B). It is a fairly straightforward
task to verify that the formula αi ∧ βj is equivalent to the disjunction:∨
{χ(O, c1, c2) | (O, c1, c2) is a case description}
We leave this as an exercise for the reader.
3.3.4. An example without weak pullback preservation. Here is an example of a functor that
does not preserve weak pullbacks, but still has a natural modal signature that admits a
disjunctive basis. Let F be the subfunctor of P2 given by setting FX to be the set of pairs
(Y,Z) ∈ (PX)2 such that at least one of the sets Y, Z is finite. That is:
FX = (PωX × PX) ∪ (PX × PωX).
This is a well defined subfunctor of P2 since the direct image of a finite subset Y ⊆ X under
any given map f : X → X ′ is finite.
F does not preserve weak pullbacks. To see why, consider the constant map c : ω → {0},
and consider the following two objects in Fω: α = ({0}, ω) and β = (ω, {0}). Clearly,
Fc(α) = Fc(β) = ({0}, {0}). But given that (P, p1, p2) is the pullback of the diagram:
ω −→ {0} ←− ω where both maps are equal to c, if F preserves weak pullbacks then there
should be some pair χ = (Y,Z) ∈ FP such that Fp1(χ) = α and Fp2(χ) = β. But then
p1[Z] = ω and likewise p2[Y ] = ω. So both Y and Z would have to be infinite, contradicting
our definition of F.
Consider the modal signature consisting of the usual labelled diamond modalities 30 and
31, quantifying over the left and right set in a pair (Y,Z) ∈ FX respectively, and their dual
box modalities. Then we can define corresponding (finitary) nablas ∇0 and ∇1 in the usual
way. Then, finite disjunctions of > and conjunctions of the form ∇0A0 ∧ ∇1A1 for finite
sets A0, A1 will provide a disjunctive basis for this signature. The reason that the formulas
∇0A0 ∧∇1A1 are still disjunctive is this: given a one-step model (X, (Y,Z),m) satisfying
the formula ∇0A0 ∧ ∇1A1, where (Y,Z) ∈ FX and m is a marking, we can construct an
appropriate one-step frame morphism f : (X ′, (Y ′, Z ′))→ (X, (Y, Z)) and a marking m′ on
X ′ as follows. Take:
X ′ := (X ×A0) ∪ (X ×A1),
Y ′ := {(u, a) ∈ Y ×A0 | a ∈ m(u)},
Z ′ := {(u, a) ∈ Z ×A1 | a ∈ m(u)}.
The map f is of course just the projection to X, and the marking m′ is defined by m′(u, a) =
{a}. The crucial point is that since one of Y, Z is finite, and since A0, A1 are both finite
sets, one of the sets Y ′, Z ′ is finite too, so (Y ′, Z ′) ∈ FX ′ as required. The proof that the
formula ∇0A0 ∧∇1A1 also holds in the one-step model (X ′, (Y ′, Z ′),m′) is routine.
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3.3.5. Monotone modal logic: a signature without disjunctive basis. Finally, we provide an
example of a signature that does not admit any disjunctive basis:
Proposition 3.6. The signature ΣM consisting of the box- and diamond liftings for M does
not have a disjunctive basis.
Proof. Let L be the standard relation lifting for the monotone neighborhood functor. Given
two one-step models X, ξ,m and X ′, ξ′,m′ over a set of variables A, we write u  u′ if
m(u) ⊆ m′(u′) for u ∈ X and u′ ∈ X ′, and we say that X ′, ξ′,m′ simulates X, ξ,m if
(ξ, ξ′) ∈ L(). A straightforward proof will verify the following claim.
Claim 1 . If X ′, ξ′,m′ simulates X, ξ,m then for every one-step formula α ∈ 1ML+Λ(A),
X, ξ,m 1 α implies X ′, ξ′,m′ 1 α.
Given a set A, let ηA : A→ PA denote the map given by the unit of the powerset monad,
i.e., it is the singleton map ηA : a 7→ {a}. Furthermore, recall that ∧A is the subsitution
mapping B ∈ PA to ∧B.
Claim 2 . Let α be any one-step formula in 1MLΛ(PA) and let (X, ξ,m) be a one-step model
with m : X → PA. Consider the map ηPA : PA→ PPA, so that ηPA ◦m is a marking of X
with variables from PA.
(1) If X, ξ, ηPA ◦m 1 α then X, ξ,m 1 α[∧A].
(2) If X, ξ,m 1 α[∧A] and the empty set does not appear as a variable in α, and furthermore
m(u) is a singleton for each u ∈ X, then X, ξ, ηPA ◦m 1 α.
Proof of Claim For the first part of the proposition, it suffices to note that [[B]]1ηPA◦m ⊆
[[
∧
B]]1m for each B ∈ PA, and the result then follows by monotonicity of the predicate lifting
corresponding to the one-step formula α.
For the second part, it suffices to note that under the additional constraint that m(u) is
a singleton for each u ∈ X and the empty set does not appear as a variable in α, we have
[[
∧
B]]1m ⊆ [[B]]1ηPA◦m for each B ∈ PA that appears as a variable in α. To prove this, suppose
that u ∈ [[∧B]]1m. Since B appears in α it is non-empty, and since m(u) is a singleton, say
m(u) = {b}, it follows that we must in fact have B = {b}. Hence:
B ∈ {{b}} = {m(u)} = ηPA(m(u))
so u ∈ [[B]]1ηPA◦m as required. J
Now, let A = {a, b, c} and consider the formula ψ = ∇{{a, b}, {c}}. If 1MLΛ admits a
disjunctive basis, then there is a disjunctive formula δ in 1MLΛ(PA) such that ψ = δ[∧A].
So suppose δ ∈ 1MLΛ(PA) is disjunctive, and suppose that ψ = δ[∧A]. We may in fact
assume w.l.o.g. that the empty set does not appear as a variable in δ, since otherwise we
just use instead the formula δ[>/∅], which is still disjunctive (this is easy to prove). We
have δ[>/∅][∧A] = δ[∧A] since ∧A(∅) =
∧
∅ = >.
With this in mind, consider the one-step model X, ξ,m where X = {x1, x2, x3}, ξ =
{{x1, x2}, {x3}, X} and m(x1) = {a}, m(x2) = {b} and m(x3) = {c}. It is easy to see that
X, ξ,m 1 ψ, so by assumption X, ξ,m 1 δ[∧A]. But since the marking m maps every
element of X to a singleton, item 2 of Claim 2 gives us that X, ξ, ηPA ◦m 1 δ.
Now, define a new one-step model X, ξ, h where as before X = {x1, x2, x3} and ξ =
{{x1, x2}, {x3}, X} but where the marking h : X → PPA (with respect to variables in PA)
is defined by setting h(x1) = {{a}}, h(x2) = {{a}, {c}} and h(x3) = {{c}}. It is a matter of
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simple verification to check that X, ξ, h in fact simulates X, ξ, ηPA ◦m, so by Proposition 1
we get X, ξ, h 1 δ.
Since δ is disjunctive, there should be a one-step model X ′, ξ′, h′ and a map f : X ′ → X
such that: X ′, ξ′, h′ 1 δ, Mf(ξ′) = ξ, h′(u) ⊆ h(f(u)) for all u ∈ X ′ and h′(u) is at most a
singleton for each u ∈ X ′. By monotonicity of δ we can in fact assume w.l.o.g. that h′(u)
is precisely a singleton for each u ∈ X ′: if h′(u) = ∅, just pick some element e of h(f(u))
(since h(v) is non-empty for each v ∈ X) and set h′(u) = {e}. The resulting marking still
satisfies all the conditions above.
But this means that we can define a marking n : X ′ → PA by taking each n(u) for u ∈ X ′
to be the unique B ⊆ A such that h′(u) = {B}. Clearly, h′ = ηPA ◦ n, so by the first part of
Claim 2, we get X ′, ξ′, n 1 δ[∧A], hence X ′, ξ′, n 1 ψ, i.e. X ′, ξ′, n 1 ∇{{a, b}, {c}}. But
from the definition of the marking h, the condition that h′(u) ⊆ h(f(u)) for all u ∈ X ′ and
from the definition of n it is clear that, for all u ∈ X ′, we have n(u) = {a} or n(u) = {c}.
So to finally reach our desired contradiction, it suffices to prove the following.
Claim 3 . Let X, ξ,m be any one-step model such that X, ξ,m 1 ∇{{a, b}, {c}}. Then
either there is some u ∈ X with {a, c} ⊆ m(u), or there is some u ∈ X with b ∈ m(u).
Proof of Claim Suppose there is no u ∈ X with b ∈ m(u). Then there is some set Z ∈ ξ
such that every v ∈ Z satisfies a. Furthermore there must be some B ∈ ξ such that every
l ∈ B is satisfied by some member of Z. The only choice possible for this is {c}, hence some
member of Z must satisfy both a and c. J
This finishes the proof of Proposition 3.6.
Interestingly, we may “repair” the failure of admitting a disjunctive basis by moving
to the supported companion functor M. This functor is defined as the subfunctor of P×M,
given (on objects) by MS := {(U, σ) ∈ PS ×MS | U supports σ}, where we refer for the
definition of the notion of support to Definition 7.1. If we add to the signature ΣM of
monotone modal logic a box and diamond modality accessing the support, we obtain a
signature which does admit a disjunctive basis. This is connected with Proposition 3.3
and the fact that the functor M preserves weak pullbacks, which was proved in [8]. The
supported companion functor features prominently in our completeness proof (with Seifan)
for the monotone µ-calculus [8].
4. Disjunctive automata and simulation
We now introduce disjunctive automata, which serve as a coalgebraic generalization of
non-deterministic automata for the modal µ-calculus. We refer to the sections 2.5 and 2.4 for
background on, respectively, automata and their connection with µ-calculi, and the infinite
games in which their semantics is formulated.
Definition 4.1. A (Λ, X)-automaton A = (A,Θ,Ω, aI) is said to be disjunctive if Θ(c, a) is
disjunctive, for all colors c ∈ PX and all states a ∈ A.
Given a disjunctive basis D, we say that A is a D-automaton if Θ(c, a) ∈ D(A), for all
colors c ∈ PX and all states a ∈ A.
Definition 4.2. Let A be a Λ-automaton and let (S, sI) be a pointed T-model. A strategy
f for ∃ in A(A,S)@(a, s) is dividing if for every t in S there is at most one state b in A such
that the position (b, t) is f-reachable (i.e., occurs in some f -guided match). We say that
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A strongly accepts (S, sI), notation: S, sI s A if ∃ has a dividing winning strategy in the
game A(A,S)@(aI , sI).
Disjunctive automata are very well behaved. For instance, the following observation
states a linear-size model property. This observation goes back to Janin & Walukiewicz [18],
who proved the linear-size model property for so-called disjunctive formulas of the modal
µ-calculus. Their result was generalised to the coalgebraic setting of ∇-based automata by
Kupke & Venema [22].
Theorem 4.1. Let A = (A,Θ, aI ,Ω) be a disjunctive automaton for a set functor T. If A
accepts some pointed T-model, then it accepts one of which the carrier S satisfies S ⊆ A.
The main property of disjunctive automata, which we will use throughout the remainder
of this paper, is the following.
Proposition 4.2. Let A be a disjunctive Λ-automaton. Then any pointed T-model which is
accepted by A has a pre-image model which is strongly accepted by A.
Proof. Let S = (S, σ, V ) be a pointed T-model, let sI ∈ S, and let f be a winning strategy
for ∃ in the acceptance game A := A(A,S)@(aI , sI). By Fact 2.12 we may without loss of
generality assume that f is positional. We will construct (i) a pointed T-model (X, ξ,W, xI),
(ii) a tree (X,R) which is rooted at xI (in the sense that for every t ∈ X there is a unique
R-path from xI to x) and supports (X, ξ) (in the sense that ξ(x) ∈ TR(x), for every x ∈ X),
and (iii) a morphism h : (X, ξ,W )→ (S, σ, V ) such that h(xI) = sI . In addition (X, ξ,W, xI)
will be strongly accepted by A.
More in detail, we will construct all of the above step by step, and by a simultaneous
induction we will associate, with each t ∈ X of depth k, a (partial) f -guided match Σt of
length 2k + 1; we will denote the final position of Σt as (at, st), and will define h(t) := st.
For the base step of the construction we take some fresh object xI , we define ΣxI to be
the match consisting of the single position (aI , sI), and set h(xI) := sI .
Inductively assume that we are dealing with a node t ∈ X of depth k, and that Σt, at
and st are as described above. Since Σt is an f -guided match and f is a winning strategy in
A, the pair (at, st) is a winning position for ∃ in A. In particular, the marking mt : S → PA
prescribed by f at this position satisfies
S, σ(st),mt 1 Θ(at, V [(st)).
Now by disjunctiveness of the automaton A there is a set R(t) (that we may take to
consist of fresh objects), an object ξ(t) ∈ TR(t), an A-marking m′t : R(t) → PA and
a map ht : R(t) → S, such that4 |m(u)| = 1 and m′t(u) ⊆ mt(ht(u)) for all u ∈ R(t),
(Tht)ξ(t) = σ(st) and
R(t), ξ(t),m′t 1 Θ(at, V [(st)).
Let au be the unique object such that m
′
t(u) = {au}, define su := ht(u), and let Σu be the
match Σu := Σt ·mt · (au, su).
With (X,R, xI) the tree constructed in this way, and observing that ξ(t) ∈ R(t) ⊆ X, we
let ξ be the coalgebra map on X. Taking h : X → S to be the union {(xI , sI)}∪{ht | t ∈ X},
we can easily verify that h is a surjective coalgebra morphism. Finally, we define the
valuation W : X→ PX by putting W (p) := {x ∈ X | hx ∈ V (p)}.
4To simplify our construction, we strengthen clause (3) in Definition 3.1. This is not without loss of
generality, but we may take care of the general case using a routine extension of the present proof.
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It remains to show that A strongly accepts the pointed T-model (X, xI), with X =
(X, ξ,W ); for this purpose consider the following (positional) strategy f ′ for ∃ in A(A,X).
At a position (a, t) ∈ A×X such that a 6= at ∃ moves randomly (we may show that such
a position will not occur); on the other hand, at a position of the form (at, t), the move
suggested by the strategy f ′ is the marking m′t. Then it is obvious that f ′ is a dividing
strategy; to see that f ′ is winning from starting position (aI , xI), consider an infinite match
Σ of A(A,X)@(aI , xI) (finite matches are left to the reader). It is not hard to see that Σ must
be of the form Σ = (a0, x0)m
′
x0(a1, x1)m
′
x1 · · · , where Σ− = (a0, h(x0))mx0(a1, h(x1))mx1 · · ·
is an f -guided match of A. From this observation it is immediate that Σ is won by ∃.
We now come to our main application of disjunctive bases, and fill in the main missing
piece in the theory of coalgebraic automata based on predicate liftings: a simulation theorem.
As mentioned in the introduction, Janin & Walukiewicz’ simulation theorem [18] is one of
the key tools in the theory of the standard modal µ-calculus, see for instance [36] for many
examples. At the coalgebraic level of generality, a first simulation theorem was proved by
Kupke & Venema [22] for ∇-based automata.
Theorem 4.3 (Simulation). Let Λ be a monotone modal signature for the set functor T and
assume that Λ has a disjunctive basis D. Then there is an effective construction transforming
an arbitrary Λ-automaton A into an equivalent D-automaton sim(A).
Proof. Let A = (A,Θ,Ω, aI) be a Λ-automaton. Our definition of sim(A) is rather stan-
dard [36], so we will confine ourselves to the definitions. The construction takes place in two
steps, a ‘pre-simulation’ step that produces a disjunctive automaton pre(A) with a non-parity
acceptance condition, and a second ‘synchronization’ step that turns this nonstandard dis-
junctive automaton into a standard one. Both steps of the construction involve a ‘change of
base’ in the sense that we obtain the transition map of the new automaton via a substitution
relating its carrier to the carrier of the old automaton.
We define the pre-simulation automaton of A as the structure
pre(A) := (A],Θ],NBTA, RI),
where the carrier of the pre-simulation pre(A) of A is the collection A] of binary relations
over A, and the initial state RI is the singleton pair {(aI , aI)}. For its transition function,
first define the map Θ? : A× PX→ 1ML+Λ(A×A) by putting, for a ∈ A and c ∈ PX:
Θ?(a, c) := Θ(a, c)[θa],
where θa : A→ Latt(A×A) is the tagging substitution given by θa : b 7→ (a, b). Now, given
a state R ∈ A] and color c ∈ PX, take Θ](R, c) to be an arbitrary but fixed formula in D(A])
such that
Θ](R, c)[∧A×A] ≡
∧
a∈RanR
Θ?(a, c).
Clearly such a formula exists by our assumption on D being a disjunctive basis for Λ.
Turning to the acceptance condition, define a trace on an A]-stream ρ = (Rn)0≤n<ω to
be an A-stream α = (an)0≤n<ω with Riaiai+1 for all i ≤ 0. Calling such a trace α bad if
max{Ω(a) | a occurs infinitely often in α} is odd, we obtain the acceptance condition of the
automaton pre(A) as the set NBTA ⊆ (A])ω of A]-streams that contain no bad trace.
Finally we produce the simulation of A by forming a certain kind of product of pre(A)
with Z, where Z = (Z, δ,Ω′, zI) is some deterministic parity stream automaton recognizing
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the ω-regular language NBTA. More precisely, we define sim(A) := (A]×Z,Θ′′,Ω′′, (RI , zI))
where:
• Θ′′(R, z) := Θ](R)[(Q, δ(R, z)/Q) | Q ∈ A]] and
• Ω′′(R, z) := Ω′(z).
The equivalence of A and sim(A) can be proved by relatively standard means [36].
5. Lyndon theorems
Lyndon’s classical theorem in model theory provides a syntactic characterization of a semantic
property, showing that a formula is monotone in a predicate P if and only if it is equivalent
to a formula in which P occurs only positively. A version of this result for the modal
µ-calculus was proved by d’Agostino and Hollenberg in [6]. Here, we show that their result
holds for any µ-calculus based on a signature that admits a disjunctive basis.
We first turn to the one-step version of the Lyndon Theorem, for which we need the
following definition; we also recall the substitutions ∧A and ∨A defined in Section 2.
Definition 5.1. A propositional A-type is a subset of A. For B ⊆ A and a ∈ A, the formulas
τB and τ
a+
B are defined by:
τB :=
∧
B ∧∧{¬a | a ∈ A \B}
τa+B :=
∧
B ∧∧{¬b | b ∈ A \ (B ∪ {a})}
We let τ and τa+ denote the maps B 7→ τB and B 7→ τa+B , respectively.
Proposition 5.1. Suppose Λ admits a disjunctive basis. Then for any formula α in 1MLΛ(A)
there is a one-step equivalent formula of the form δ[∨PA][τ ] for some δ ∈ D(PPA).
Proof. We first check that everything is correctly typed: note that we have ∨PA : PPA→
Bool(PA) and so δ[∨PA] ∈ 1MLΛ(PA), and τPA : PA → Bool(A). So δ[∨PA][τ ] ∈ 1MLΛ(A),
as required.
For the normal form proof, first note that we can use boolean duals of the modal
operators to push negations down to the zero-step level. Putting the resulting formula in
disjunctive normal form, we obtain a disjunction of formulas of the form ♥λ1pi1∧· · ·∧♥λkpik,
where all the pi-formulas are in Bool(A). Repeatedly applying the distributivity of D over Λ
and the distributive law for D, we can rewrite each such disjunct as a formula of the form δ[σ]
where, for some set B, δ ∈ D(B) and σ : B → Bool(A) is some propositional substitution.
Now, just apply propositional logic to rewrite each formula σb as a disjunction of formulas
in τ [PA], and we are done.
Theorem 5.2 (One-step Lyndon theorem). Let Λ be a monotone modal signature for the
set functor T and assume that Λ has a disjunctive basis. Any α ∈ 1MLΛ(A), monotone in the
variable a ∈ A, is one-step equivalent to some formula in 1MLΛ(A), which is positive in a.
Proof. By Proposition 5.1, we can assume that α is of the form δ[∨PA][τ ] for some δ ∈ D(PA).
Clearly it suffices to show that:
δ[∨PA][τ ] ≡1 δ[∨PA][τa+]
One direction, from left to right, is easy since δ[∨PA] is a monotone formula in 1MLΛ(PA),
and [[τB]]
0
m ⊆ [[τa+B ]]0m for each B ⊆ A and each marking m : X → PA.
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For the converse direction, suppose X, ξ,m 1 δ[∨PA][τa+]. We define a PA-marking
m0 : X → PPA by setting m0(u) := {B ⊆ A | B a m(u)}, where the relation a
over PA is defined by B a B′ iff B \ {a} = B′ \ {a}, and a /∈ B or a ∈ B′. We claim
that X, ξ,m0 1 δ[∨PA]. Since δ[∨PA] is a monotone formula, it suffices to check that
[[τa+B ]]
0
m ⊆ [[B]]0m0 for each B ⊆ A. This follows by just unfolding definitions.
Since δ was disjunctive, so is δ[∨PA], as an easy argument will reveal. So we now find a
one-step frame morphism f : (X ′, ξ′)→ (X, ξ), together with a marking m′ : X ′ → PPA such
that |m′(u)| ≤ 1 and m′(u) ⊆ m0(f(u)) for all u ∈ X ′, and such that X ′, ξ′,m′ 1 δ[∨PA].
We define a new A-marking m′′ : X ′ → PA on X ′ by setting m′′(u) = B, if m′(u) = {B},
and m′′(u) = m(f(u)) if m′(u) = ∅. Note that, for each B ⊆ A, we have [[B]]0m′ ⊆ [[τB]]0m′′ ,
so by monotonicity of δ[∨PA] we get X ′, ξ′,m′′ 1 δ[∨PA][τ ].
Comparing the markings m′′ and m ◦ f , we claim that m′′(u) a m(f(u)) for all u ∈ X ′.
If m′(u) = ∅, then in fact m′′(u) = m(f(u)) by definition of m′′. If m′(u) = {B}, then
m′′(u) = B ∈ m′(u) ⊆ m0(f(u)), hence B a m(f(u)) by definition of m0. Since δ[∨PA][τ ]
was monotone with respect to the variable a it follows that X ′, ξ′,m ◦ f 1 δ[∨PA][τ ] and so
X, ξ,m 1 δ[∨PA][τ ] by naturality, thus completing the proof of the theorem.
A useful corollary to this theorem is that, given an expressively complete set Λ of
predicate liftings for a functor T, the language µMLΛ has the same expressive power as the
full language µMLT. At first glance this proposition may seem trivial, but it is important to
see that it is not: given a formula ϕ of µMLT, a naive definition of an equivalent formula in
µMLΛ would be to apply expressive completeness to simply replace each subformula of the
form ♥λ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) with an equivalent one-step formula α over {ψ1, . . . , ψn}, using only
predicate liftings in Λ. But if this subformula contains bound fixpoint variables, these must
still appear positively in α in order for the translation to even produce a grammatically
correct formula! We need the stronger condition of Lyndon completeness for Λ. Generally,
we have no guarantee that expressive completeness entails Lyndon completeness, but in the
presence of a disjunctive basis, we do: this is a consequence of Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 5.3. Suppose Λ is an expressively complete set of monotone predicate liftings for
T. If Λ admits a disjunctive basis, then Λ is Lyndon complete and hence µMLΛ ≡ µMLT.
Proof. The simplest proof uses automata: pick a modal Λ′-automaton A, where Λ′ is the set
of all monotone predicate liftings for T, and apply expressive completeness to replace each
formula α in the co-domain of the transition map Θ with an equivalent one-step formula
α′ using only liftings in Λ. This formula is still monotone in all the variables in A since it
is equivalent to α, so we can apply the one-step Lyndon Theorem 5.2 to replace α′ by an
equivalent and positive one-step formula β in 1MLΛ(A). Clearly, the resulting automaton A′
will be semantically equivalent to A.
We now turn to our Lyndon Theorems for the full coalgebraic modal (fixpoint) languages.
Let (µMLΛ)
M
p and (MLΛ)
M
p denote the fragments of respectively µMLΛ and MLΛ, consisting of
the formulas that are positive in the proposition letter p.
Theorem 5.4 (Lyndon Theorem). There is an effective translation (·)Mp : µMLΛ → (µMLΛ)Mp ,
which restricts to a map (·)Mp : MLΛ → (MLΛ)Mp , and satisfies that
ϕ ∈ µML is monotone in p iff ϕ ≡ ϕMp .
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Proof. By the equivalence between formulas and Λ-automata and the Simulation Theorem,
it suffices to prove the analogous statement for disjunctive coalgebra automata.
Given a disjunctive Λ-automaton A = (A,Θ,Ω, aI), we define AMp to be the automaton
(A,ΘMp ,Ω, aI), where
ΘMp (a, c) :=
{
Θ(a, c) ∨Θ(a, c \ {p}) if p ∈ c
Θ(a, c) if p 6∈ c.
Clearly AMp is a disjunctive automaton as well, and it is routine to show that AMp is equivalent
to a formula in µMLΛ that is positive in the variable p. The key observation is that we have
the following valid equivalence of classical propositional logic, for any formulas pi,Θ1,Θ2:
(pi ∧ ¬p ∧Θ1) ∨ (pi ∧ p ∧ (Θ1 ∨Θ2)) ⇔ (pi ∧Θ1) ∨ (pi ∧ p ∧Θ2)
We claim that A is monotone in p iff A ≡ AMp . Leaving the easy direction from right to
left to the reader, we prove the opposite implication. So assume that A is monotone in p.
Since it immediately follows from the definitions that A always implies AMp , we are left to
show that AMp implies A, and since AMp is disjunctive, by Proposition 4.2 and invariance of
acceptance by coalgebra automata it suffices to prove the following:
S, sI s AMp implies S, sI  A, (5.1)
for an arbitrary T-model (S, sI).
To prove (5.1), let f be a dividing winning strategy for ∃ in AM := A(AMp , S)@(aI , sI).
Our aim is to find a subset U ⊆ V (p) such that S[p 7→ U ], sI  A; it then follows by
mononotonicity that S, sI  A. Call a point s ∈ S f -accessible if there is a (by assumption
unique) state as such that the position (as, s) is f -reachable in AM . We define U as the set
of f -accessible elements s of V (p) such that:
S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [(s)),
where ms is the A-marking provided by f at position (as, s). We let VU abbreviate V [p 7→ U ].
We claim that
if s is f -accessible then S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [U (s)). (5.2)
To see why (5.2) holds, note that for any f -accessible point s, the marking ms is a legitimate
move at position (as, s), since f is assumed to be winning for ∃ in AM . In other words,
we have S, σ(s),ms 1 ΘMp (as, V [(s)). We have to make a case distinction, between the
following three cases:
Case 1: p /∈ V [U (s) and p /∈ V [(s). Then Θ(as, V [U (s)) = ΘMp (as, V [(s)), so we get
S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [U (s)) as required.
Case 2: p /∈ V [U (s) but p ∈ V [(s). Then Θ(as, V [(s)) does not hold in the one-step model
S, σ(s),ms, so by definition of Θ
M
p we have S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [(s) \ {p}). But
V [(s) \ {p} = V [U (s), so again we get S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [U (s)) as required.
Case 3: p ∈ V [U (s). In this case we have S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [(s)) by definition of the
valuation VU . Furthermore, since V
[(s) = V [U (s), we get S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [U (s)).
Hence, (5.2) holds in all three possible cases. Finally, it is straightforward to derive from (5.2)
that f itself is a (dividing) winning strategy for ∃ in the acceptance game A(A,S) initialized
at (aI , sI).
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Remark 5.2. Observe that as a corollary of Theorem 5.4 and the decidability of the
satisfiability problem of µMLΛ [3], it is decidable whether a given formula ϕ ∈ µMLΛ is
monotone in p.
6. Uniform Interpolation
Uniform interpolation is a very strong form of the interpolation theorem, first proved for
the modal µ-calculus in [6]. It was later generalized to coalgebraic modal logics in [26].
However, the proof crucially relies on non-deterministic automata, and for that reason the
generalization in [26] is stated for nabla-based languages. With a simulation theorem for
predicate liftings based automata in place, we can prove the uniform interpolation theorem
for a large class of µ-calculi based on predicate liftings.
Definition 6.1. Given a formula ϕ ∈ µMLΛ, we let Xϕ denote the set of proposition letters
occurring in ϕ. Given a set X of proposition letters and a single proposition letter p, it may
be convenient to denote the set X ∪ {p} as Xp.
Definition 6.2. A logic L with semantic consequence relation |= is said to have the property
of uniform interpolation if, for any formula ϕ ∈ L and any set X ⊆ Xϕ of proposition letters,
there is a formula ϕX ∈ L(X), effectively constructible from ϕ, such that
ϕ |= ψ iff ϕX |= ψ, (6.1)
for every formula ψ ∈ L such that Xϕ ∩ Xψ ⊆ X.
To see why this property is called uniform interpolation, it is not hard to prove that, if
ϕ |= ψ, with Xϕ ∩ Xψ ⊆ X, then the formula ϕX is indeed an interpolant in the sense that
ϕ |= ϕX |= ψ and XϕX ⊆ Xϕ ∩ Xψ.
Theorem 6.1 (Uniform Interpolation). Let Λ be a monotone modal signature for the set
functor T and assume that Λ has a disjunctive basis. Then both logics MLΛ and µMLΛ enjoy
the property of uniform interpolation.
Following D’Agostino & Hollenberg [6], we prove Theorem 6.1 by automata-theoretic
means. The key proposition in our proof is Proposition 6.2 below, which refers to the
following construction on disjunctive automata.
Definition 6.3. Let X be a set of proposition letters not containing the letter p. Given a
disjunctive (Λ, Xp)-automaton A = (A,Θ,Ω, aI), we define the map Θ∃p : A× PX→ D(A) by
Θ∃p(a, c) := Θ(a, c) ∨Θ(a, c ∪ {p}),
and we let A∃p denote the (Λ, X)-automaton (A,Θ∃p,Ω, aI).
The following proposition shows that the operation (·)∃p behaves like an existential
quantifier, but with a twist: the automaton A∃p accepts a pointed coalgebra model (S, sI) iff
for some subset P of some preimage model(S′, s′I), the model (S′[p 7→ P ], s′I) is accepted by
A.
Proposition 6.2. Let X ⊆ Y be sets of proposition letters, both not containing the letter p.
Then for any disjunctive (Λ, Xp)-automaton A and any pointed T-model (S, sI) over Y:
S, sI  A∃p iff S′, s′I s A for some Yp-model (S′, s′I) such that S′Y , s′I → S, sI . (6.2)
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Proof. We only prove the direction from left to right, leaving the other (easier) direction as
an exercise to the reader. For notational convenience we assume that X = Y.
By Proposition 4.2 it suffices to assume that (S, sI) is strongly accepted by A∃p and
find a subset U of S for which we can prove that S[p 7→ U ], sI s A. So let f be a dividing
winning strategy for ∃ in A(A∃p, S)@(aI , sI) witnessing that S, sI s A∃p. Call a point s ∈ S
f-accessible if there is a state a ∈ A such that the position (a, s) is f -reachable; since this
state is unique by the assumption of strong acceptance we may denote it as as. Clearly
any position of the form (as, s) is winning for ∃, and hence by legitimacy of f it holds in
particular that
S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ∃p(as, V [(s)),
where ms : S → PA denotes the marking selected by f at position (as, s). Recalling that
Θ∃p(as, V [(s)) = Θ(as, V [(s)) ∨Θ(as, V [(s) ∪ {p}), we define
U := {s ∈ S | s is f -accessible and S, σ(s),ms 61 Θ(as, V [(s))}.
By this we ensure that, for all f -accessible points s:
s 6∈ U implies S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [(s)) (6.3)
while s ∈ U implies S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [(s) ∪ {p}) (6.4)
Now consider the valuation VU := V [p 7→ U ], and observe that by this definition we have
V [U (s) = V
[(s) if s 6∈ U while V [U (s) = V [(s) ∪ {p} if s ∈ U . Combining this with (6.3)
and (6.4) we find that
S, σ(s),ms 1 Θ(as, V [U )
whenever s is f -accessible. In other words, f provides a legitimate move ms in A(A,S)@(as, s)
at any position of the form (as, s). From this it is straightforward to derive that f itself
is a (dividing) winning strategy for ∃ in A(A,S[p 7→ U ])@(aI , sI), and so we obtain that
S[p 7→ U ], sI s A as required.
The remaining part of the argument follows by a fairly standard argument going back
to D’Agostino & Hollenberg [6] (see also Marti et alii [26]) — a minor difference being that
our quantification operation (·)∃p refers to pre-images rather than to bisimilar models.
Proposition 6.3. Given any proposition letter p, there is a map ∃˜p on µMLΛ, restricting to
MLΛ, such that X∃˜p.ϕ = Xϕ \ {p} and, for every pointed (S, sI) over a set Y ⊇ Xϕ with p 6∈ Y:
S, sI  ∃˜p.ϕ iff S′, s′I  ϕ for some Yp-model (S′, s′I) such that S′Y , s′I → S, sI . (6.5)
Proof. Straightforward by the equivalence between formulas and Λ-automata, the Simulation
Theorem, and Proposition 6.2.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. With p1, . . . , pn enumerating the proposition letters in Xϕ \X, set
ϕX := ∃˜p1∃˜p2 · · · ∃˜pn.ϕ.
Then a relatively routine exercise shows that ϕ |= ψ iff ϕX |= ψ, for all formulas ψ ∈ µMLΛ
such that Xϕ∩Xψ ⊆ X. For some detail, first assume that ϕ |= ψ, and take an arbitrary pointed
model (S0, s0) over some set Y ⊇ Xψ∪X such that Y∩{p1, . . . , pn} = ∅ and S0, s0  ϕX. Then
successive applications of Proposition 6.3 provide, for i = 1, . . . , n, pointed T-models (Si, si)
over Y ∪ {p1, . . . , pi} such that (Si, si)  ∃˜pi+1 · · · ∃˜pn.ϕ and Si+1(Y∪{p1,...,pi}) , si+1 → Si, si,
for all i. Thus in particular we have Sn, sn  ϕ, from which it follows by assumption that
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Sn, sn  ψ, and since SnY , sn → S0, s0 by transitivity of →, this implies that S0, s0  ψ, as
required. Conversely, to show that ϕX |= ψ implies ϕ |= ψ, it suffices to prove that ϕ |= ϕX;
but this is almost immediate from the definitions.
Finally, it is not difficult to verify that ϕX is fixpoint-free if ϕ is so; that is, the uniform
interpolants of a formula in MLΛ also belong to MLΛ.
7. A Janin-Walukiewicz theorem via disjunctive bases
Our goal in this section is to prove a coalgebraic generalization of the Janin-Walukiewicz
theorem for the modal µ-calculus, using disjunctive bases. In joint work with Fatemeh
Seifan [9], we have previously proved such results using automata for coalgebraic MSO
and assuming some conditions on a version of the modal one-step language extended with
monadic second-order quantifiers. The result that we present here uses only a condition on
the modal one-step language itself, and avoids the use of automata for the MSO-language.
This also means that we get a new proof of the Janin-Walukiewicz theorem for the µ-calculus,
which proceeds via a strong form of bisimulation quantifiers.
In this section we will not assume that the coalgebraic type functor T preserves inclusion
maps, since the notion of a support will play an important role and so we want to be as
explicit about it as possible. Instead we make the weaker assumption that T preserves all
monics in Set.5
Definition 7.1. Given ξ ∈ TX, a support of ξ is a subset X ′ ⊆ X such that there is some
ξ′ ∈ TX ′ with Tι(ξ′) = ξ, where ι : X ′ → X is the inclusion map. Since T preserves monics,
if X ′ is a support of ξ ∈ TX then there is a unique ξ′ ∈ TX ′ with Tι(ξ′) = ξ; we shall denote
this object by ξ|X′ .
We say that T naturally admits minimal supports if there is a natural transformation
sup : T⇒ P such that supX(ξ) is the smallest support for ξ for any ξ ∈ TX.
It follows by results of Gumm [16] that a finitary functor naturally admits minimal
supports iff it weakly preserves pre-images ; thus for instance, all finitary functors preserving
weak pullbacks have the property. Functors lacking this property include the monotone
neighborhoud functor M. The reason that we require the map sup to be natural is to ensure
that it gives rise to a predicate lifting for the functor T. In particular, if a modal signature
contains this predicate lifting then we can reason about supports within the object language.
More generally:
Definition 7.2. If T naturally admits minimal supports, we say that the modal signature Λ
for T has the support modality if there is a positive one-step formula 2a such that a one-step
model (X, ξ,m) satisfies 2a iff v 0 a for all v ∈ supX(ξ).
For example, the powerset functor has the support modality 2 witnessed by the identity
natural transformation on P. The multi-set functor has the support modality 21 witnessed
by the natural transformation mapping ξ 7→ {v ∈ X | ξ(v) > 0} for ξ ∈ BX. More generally,
it follows by the earlier mentioned results of Gumm [16] that any Lyndon complete modal
signature for a finitary functor that weakly preserves pre-images has the support modality.
Coalgebraic monadic second-order logic was introduced in [9].
5This is a harmless assumption as we can modify T into a functor T′ that does preserve monics, only by
changing its value on the empty set. Since there is only one coalgebra on the empty set, the collection of
coalgebras for T and T′ is the same.
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Definition 7.3. Given a modal signature Λ, we define the syntax of the monadic second-
order logic MSOΛ by the following grammar:
ϕ := sr(p) | p ⊆ q | λ(p, q1, .., qn) | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ¬ϕ | ∃p.ϕ
where λ is any n-place monotone predicate lifting in Λ and p, q, q1, . . . , qn ∈ V ar. For the
semantics, let (S, s) be a pointed T-model, where S = (S, σ, V ). We define the satisfaction
relation  ⊆ S × MSOΛ as follows:
(S, s)  sr(p) iff V (p) = {s}
(S, s)  p ⊆ q iff V (p) ⊆ V (q),
(S, s)  λ(p, q1, . . . , qn) iff σ(v) ∈ λS(V (q1), .., V (qn)) for all v ∈ V (p)
(S, s)  ∃p.ϕ iff (S, σ, V [p 7→ Z], s)  ϕ, some Z ⊆ S,
while we use standard clauses for the Boolean connectives.
The problem we address in this section is to compare the expressive power of coalgebraic
monadic second-order logic to that of the coalgebraic µ-calculus.
Definition 7.4. A formula ϕ ∈ MSOΛ is bisimulation invariant if for all pointed T-models
(S, s) and (S′, s′) it holds that S, s  ϕ and (S, s) ' (S′, s′) implies S′, s′  ϕ.
Our goal is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 7.1. Suppose that T naturally admits minimal supports, and that the modal
signature Λ admits a uniform disjunctive basis, and has the support modality. Then µMLΛ is
the bisimulation invariant fragment of MSOΛ, i.e., a formula of MSOΛ is bisimulation invariant
if and only if it is equivalent to a formula in µMLΛ.
The assumption that T naturally admits minimal supports and Λ has the support
modality is used to ensure that the we can express hidden first-order quantifiers such as
in formulas p ⊆ q, “up to behavioural equivalence”, in the language µMLΛ. The following
observation provides the easy part of the theorem — we omit the proof, which is routine.
Proposition 7.2. Let Λ be a set of monotone predicate liftings for the set functor T. There
is an inductively defined translation (·) mapping any formula ϕ ∈ µMLΛ to a semantically
equivalent formula ϕ ∈ MSOΛ.
For the opposite direction, we need to slightly refine the construction from the proof of
Proposition 4.2. Fix a uniform disjunctive basis D. For every one-step frame (X, ξ), we first
make use of the assumptions that T naturally admits minimal supports, and then let
fξ : (X∗, ξ∗)→ (supX(ξ), ξ|supX(ξ))
be the one-step frame morphism witnessing that D is a uniform disjunctive basis, for the
case of the one-step frame (supX(ξ), ξ|supX(ξ)). Then ιsupX(ξ),X ◦ fξ : (X∗, ξ∗)→ (X, ξ) is also
a one-step frame morphism. Note furthermore that the map fξ : X∗ → supX(ξ) has to be
surjective, since otherwise fξ[X∗] is a support for T(ιsupX(ξ),X ◦ fξ)(ξ∗) in X which is smaller
than supX(ξ), which contradicts the definition.
Definition 7.5. Given a pointed T-model (S, s), let the supporting Kripke frame be (S,RS)
where vRSw iff w ∈ supS(σ(v)).
The following proposition is similar to Proposition 4.2 in Section 4, but note that there
are a few crucial differences. In particular, conditions (1) – (3) state conditions for the
supporting Kripke frames involved in the construction, which only make sense when T
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naturally admits minimal supports. Furthermore, we are making use of the existence of a
uniform disjunctive basis to ensure that the construction is dependent only on the input
T-model (S, s), and cannot depend on an automaton A as an extra parameter.
Proposition 7.3. There is a construction that provides, for every T-model (S, s), a pre-
image fS : (S∗, s∗)→ (S, s) such that:
(1) the structure (S∗, RS∗) is a tree rooted at s∗;
(2) the map fS is both a T-model homomorphism and a morphism of the supporting Kripke
frames;
(3) fS maps S∗ surjectively onto the set of points in S that are reachable from s via the
reflexive transitive closure of the support relation RS;
(4) any disjunctive Λ-automaton A accepts (S, s) iff it strongly accepts (S∗, s∗).
Proof. The construction of the pre-image fS : (S∗, s∗) → (S, s) essentially follows the
construction used in the proof of Proposition 5.7 in [9], from which the first two conditions
follow. Given that we have constructed the covers ιsupX(ξ),X ◦ fξ : (X∗, ξ∗)→ (X, ξ) so that
they factor epi-monically through the natural inclusion of supports ιsupX(ξ),X : supX(ξ)→ X,
it is easy to verify condition (3). For condition (4), the argument closely follows that in the
proof of Proposition 4.2 in Section 4. We omit the details.
Proof of Theorem 7.1. We provide a recursive translation t : MSOΛ(X)→ µMLΛ(X) such
that for any formula ϕ and any pointed T-model (S, s), we have:
S∗, s∗  ϕ iff S, s  t(ϕ). (7.1)
If ϕ is bisimulation invariant, it then follows that S, s  ϕ iff S∗, s∗  ϕ iff S, s  t(ϕ), so
that ϕ is equivalent to t(ϕ) as required.
The translation is defined as follows:
ϕ t(ϕ)
sr(p) p ∧ νx.2(x ∧ ¬p)
p ⊆ q νx.(p→ q) ∧2x
λ(p, q1, . . . , qn) νx.(p→ ♥λ(q1, . . . , qn)) ∧2x
α ∨ β t(α) ∨ t(β)
¬α ¬t(α)
∃p.α ∃˜p.t(α)
where the map ∃˜p : µMLΛ(Xp)→ µMLΛ(X) is defined precisely as in Section 6. We can now
prove the equivalence (7.1) by induction on the complexity of formulas of MSOΛ. The first
three atomic cases for sr(p), p ⊆ q and λ(p, q1, . . . , qn) can be checked by routine verification,
where the proofs for the first two cases uses the fact that the map fS maps the points of
S∗ surjectively onto the points in S, the second case additionally uses the fact that S∗ is
constructed so that its supporting Kripke frame is a tree rooted at s∗ (see [9] for details),
and the case for λ(p, q1, . . . , qn) uses the fact that fS is a T-model homomorphism. The
induction steps for boolean connectives are trivial. Finally, the proof for the crucial case of
∃p.ϕ closely follows that of Proposition 6.2, so we omit the details.
8. Disjunctive bases for combined modal logics
An important topic in modal logic concerns methods to construct complex logics from
simpler ones, in such a way that desirable metalogical properties transfer to a combined logic
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from its components. For an overview of this field, see [23]. This thread has also been picked
up in coalgebraic modal logic: in a particularly interesting paper [5], Cˆırstea & Pattinson
provide generic methods to obtain, from modal signatures for two set functors T1 and T2,
modal signatures for the coproduct, product, and composition of T1 and T2. Since the
verification that a particular modal logic has a disjunctive basis can be quite non-trivial —
as witnessed here by the case of graded modal logic — it will be useful to have some methods
available that guarantee the existence of a disjunctive basis being preserved by Cˆırstea &
Pattinson’s modular constructions of signatures. In fact, we will show that disjunctive bases
can be constructed in a modular fashion as well: in each of the cases of coproduct, product
and composition we will give an explicit construction of a disjunctive basis for the combined
signature, based on disjunctive bases for the composing functors.
8.1. Coproduct. Let T = T1 + T2 be the coproduct of the set functors T1 and T2. For
i = 1, 2 we will use κi to denote the natural transformation κi : Ti ⇒ T that instantiates
to the coproduct insertion map (κi)S : TiS → TS, for every set S. Now suppose that we
have been given signatures for T1 and T2, respectively. Following Cˆırstea & Pattinson [5],
we define the combined signature Λ1 ⊕ Λ2 for T as follows.
Definition 8.1. Where Λ1 and Λ2 are monotone modal signatures for T1 and T2 respectively,
we define
Λ1 ⊕ Λ2 := {κi ◦ λ | λ ∈ Λi}.
In the syntax we shall write ©i,λ rather than ♥κi◦λ.
We leave it for the reader to check that Λ1 ⊕ Λ2 is indeed a collection of monotone
predicate liftings for T. The meaning of the Λ1 ⊕ Λ2-modalities in an arbitrary T-coalgebra
S is given as follows:
S, s  ©i,λ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) iff
σ(s) = (κi)S(σ
i) for some σi ∈ TiS
with σi ∈ λS([[ϕ1]]S, . . . , [[ϕn]]S). (8.1)
Note that the subscript i in ©i,λ works as a tag indicating to which part of the coproduct
TS = T1S + T2S the unfolding σ(s) of the state s is situated.
The result on the existence of disjunctive bases that we want to prove is the following.
Theorem 8.1. Suppose both signatures Λ1 and Λ2 admit a disjunctive basis. Then so does
Λ1 ⊕ Λ2.
We start with giving a disjunctive basis for the combined signature.
Definition 8.2. Fix a set A = {a1, . . . , an}. Given a one-step formula α in the language
1MLΛi(A), we let α
i ∈ 1MLΛ1⊕Λ2(A) denote the result of replacing every occurrence of a
modality ♥λ with ©i,λ. Define
(D1 ⊕ D2)(A) := {δ11 ∨ δ22 ∈ 1MLΛ1⊕Λ2(A) | δi ∈ Di(A)}.
where D1 and D2 are disjunctive bases for Λ1 and Λ2, respectively.
It remains to show that D1 ⊕ D2 is a disjunctive basis for the signature Λ1 ⊕ Λ2.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. We first show that D1 ⊕ D2(A) consists of disjunctive formulas.
For this purpose we fix a set A and an arbitrary formula in D1 ⊕ D2(A), say, δ1 such that
δ ∈ D1(A). Let (S, σ,m) be an arbitrary one-step T-model such that S, σ,m 1 δ1, and make
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a case distinction. If σ = (κ2)S(σ
2) for some σ2 ∈ T2S then a straightforward induction will
show that S, σ,m′ 1 δ1, where m′(s) := ∅ for every s ∈ S.
If, on the other hand, σ = (κ1)S(σ
1) for some σ1 ∈ T1S then a routine inductive proof
will reveal that the one-step T1-model (S, σ
1,m) satisfies δ. By disjunctiveness of D1 we
then obtain a separating cover for (S, σ1,m), consisting of a one-step T1-model (S
′, σ′,m′)
and a map f : S′ → S. It is then easy to verify that the one-step T-model (S′, κ1(σ′),m′),
together with the same map f , is a separating cover for the one-step T-model (S, σ,m).
It is left to check that D1⊕D2(A) satisfies the closure conditions of disjunctive bases. We
leave it to the reader to verify that (modulo equivalence) the set D1 ⊕ D2(A) is closed under
taking disjunctions, and contains the formula >. For condition (2), take a formula of the
form ©i,λpi, where λ is a predicate lifting in Λi; without loss of generality assume i = 1. Then
by assumption there is a formula δ ∈ D1(PA) such that ♥λpi ≡1 δ[∧A]. It is straightforward
to verify that α ≡1 β implies αj ≡1 βj , for any pair of formulas α, β ∈ 1ML+Λj (A). But
then it is immediate that ©1,λpi ≡1 δ1[∧A] ≡1 (δ1 ∨ ⊥)[∧A]; clearly this suffices, since
δ1 ∨ ⊥ ∈ D1 ⊕ D2(PA).
Finally, for condition (3), consider the conjunction of two formulas in the sets D1⊕ D2(A)
and D1⊕D2(B), respectively. Using the distributive law of conjunctions over disjunctions, we
may rewrite this conjunction into an equivalent disjunction of formulas of the form αi ∧ βj ,
where α ∈ Di(A) and β ∈ Dj(B) for some {i, j} ⊆ {1, 2}. Clearly then it suffices to show that
each conjunction of the latter form can be rewritten into the required shape. We distinguish
two cases.
If i = j, then since Di is a disjunctive basis for Λi, there is a formula γ
i ∈ Di(A ∪× B)
such that α ∧ β ≡1 γi[θA,B]. It is then straightforward to verify that αi ∧ βi ≡1 γi[θA,B] ≡1
(γi ∨ ⊥)[θA,B].
If, on the other hand, i and j are distinct, then we may without loss of generality assume
that i = 1 and j = 2. We claim that in fact for any pair of formulas α ∈ 1ML+Λ1(A) and
1ML+Λ2(B) (i.e, we do not need to assume that α ∈ D1(A) or β ∈ D2(B)), the conjunction
α1 ∧ β2 is equivalent to a formula from the set {>,⊥, α1, β2}. The key observation in
the proof of this claim is that if α = ♥λpi and β = ♥ηρ, then α1 ∧ β2 ≡ ⊥ — this easily
follows from the observation about tagging that we made just after (8.1). Finally, note that
{>,⊥, α1, β2} ⊆ D1 ⊕ D2(A ∪ B). This means that every formula γ in this set belongs to
D1⊕ D2(A∪× B), and in addition satisfies that γ[θA,B ] = γ. But then clearly the claim suffices
to find a formula γ ∈ D1 ⊕ D2(A ∪× B) such that α1 ∧ β2 ≡1 γ[θA,B], as required.
8.2. Product. Given two functors T1,T2 and modal signatures Λ1,Λ2 for these functors
respectively, we construct a new modal signature Λ1 ⊗ Λ2 that contains the modalities of
both Λ1 and Λ2. We want to interpret this combined language on coalgebras that can be
seen simultaneously as both T1- and T2-coalgebras, and the natural choice is to form the
product of the two functors and consider T1 × T2-coalgebras.
Definition 8.3. Suppose Λ1,Λ2 are modal signatures for functors T1,T2 respectively. Then
the modal signature Λ1 ⊗ Λ2 for T1 × T2 is defined by:
= Λ1 ⊗ Λ2 = {P˘pii ◦ λ | λ ∈ Λi, i ∈ {1, 2}}
where pi1 : T1 × T2 → T1 and pi2 : T1 × T2 → T2 are the natural projection maps.
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For simplicity of notation we will allow a small bit of imprecision and just use the
symbol λ to denote the predicate lifting P˘pii ◦ λ, given a lifting λ for Ti. This means that
we can view the languages 1MLΛ1(A) and 1MLΛ2(A) as fragments of 1MLΛ1⊗Λ2(A). Our goal
is to prove the following.
Theorem 8.2. Suppose both signatures Λ1 and Λ2 admit a disjunctive basis. Then so does
Λ1 ⊗ Λ2.
The disjunctive basis for the combined signature is defined as follows.
Definition 8.4. Let D1, D2 be disjunctive bases for Λ1,Λ2 respectively. Given a set of
variables A we define the set of one-step formulas (D1 ⊗ D2)(A) to be all finite disjunctions
of formulas of the form δ1 ∧ δ2, where δ1 ∈ D1(A) and δ2 ∈ D2(A).
Note that > ∈ (D1 ⊗ D2)(A), since it is in D1(A) and D2(A), given that we allow a slight
abuse of notation and identify the conjunction > ∧> with >.
We will show that D1 ⊗ D2 is a disjunctive basis for Λ1 ⊗ Λ2 indeed. The first thing we
need to check is that these formulas are indeed disjunctive.
Proposition 8.3. Let δ1 ∈ D1(A) and δ2 ∈ D2(A). Then the formula δ1 ∧ δ2 is disjunctive.
Proof. Let (X, (ξ1, ξ2),m) be a one-step T1 × T2-model satisfying the formula δ1 ∧ δ2. Then
X, ξ1,m 1 δ1 and X, ξ2,m 1 δ2. Since δ1, δ2 are disjunctive there exist two covering
one-step frames h1 : (Y1, ρ1)→ (X, ξ1) and h2 : (Y2, ρ2)→ (X, ξ2) together with markings
m1 : Y1 → PX and m1 : Y2 → PX such that for each i ∈ {1, 2}:
• Yi, ρi,mi 1 δi,
• mi(u) ⊆ m(hi(u)) for all u ∈ Yi,
• |mi(u)| ≤ 1 for all u ∈ Yi.
We shall construct a covering one-step T1 × T2-frame based on the co-product Y1 + Y2 of
the sets Y1, Y2, with the covering map given by the co-tuple of the maps h1, h2, as shown in
Figure 2. We define the covering one-step frame to be (Y1 + Y2, ((T1i1)ρ1, (T2i2)ρ2)), where
Y1
i1 //
h1
--
Y1 + Y2
[h1,h2]

Y2
h2
qq
i2oo
X
Figure 2: The covering map [h1, h2]
i1, i2 are the insertions of the co-product, so that [h1, h2] ◦ i1 = h1 and [h1, h2] ◦ i2 = h2.
That the co-tuple [h1, h2] is in fact a one-step frame morphism is shown by a straightforward
calculation:
(T1 × T2)[h1, h2](T1i1ρ1,T2i2ρ2) = (T1[h1, h2] ◦ T1i1(ρ1),T2[h1, h2] ◦ T2i2(ρ2))
= (T1([h1, h2] ◦ i1)(ρ1),T2([h1, h2] ◦ i2)(ρ2))
= (T1h1(ρ1),T2h2(ρ2))
= (ξ1, ξ2)
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The commutative diagram shown in Figure 3 may help to give an overview of the
construction, in which the top middle entry shows the type of the covering one-step frame
we have constructed.
T1(Y1 + Y2)
T1[h1,h2]
//
(T1 × T2)(Y1 + Y2)oo //
(T1×T2)[h1,h2]

T2(Y1 + Y2)
T2[h1,h2]
oo
T1Y1
T1i1
OO
T1h1

T2Y2
T2i2
OO
T2h2

T1X (T1 × T2)Xoo // T2X
Figure 3: The map [h1, h2] is a one-step frame morphism
The construction is completed by defining a marking on the covering one-step T1 × T2-
frame by co-tupling the markings for each covering Ti-frame, to obtain the marking [m1,m2].
Since each of the markings m1,m2 factor through the co-tuple [m1,m2] via the insertions,
we have [m1,m2](u) ⊆ m([h1, h2](u)) for each u ∈ Y1 + Y2, and also |[m1,m2](u)| ≤ 1 for
each u ∈ Y1 + Y2.
By naturality of one-step formulas, and again since the markings m1,m2 factor through
the co-tuple [m1,m2] via the insertions, we have
Y1 + Y2,T1i1(ρ1), [m1,m2] 1 δ1
and
Y1 + Y2,T2i2(ρ2), [m1,m2] 1 δ2
It easily follows that:
Y1 + Y2, (T1i1(ρ1),T2i2(ρ2)), [m1,m2] 1 δ1 ∧ δ2
as required. So δ1 ∧ δ2 is disjunctive.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. Since we know the formulas in (D1 ⊗ D2)(A) are disjunctive, we
only need to check conditions (1) – (3) of Definition 3.2 one by one: condition (1) just requires
the formulas in a disjunctive bases to contain > and be closed under disjunctions, which
holds by definition of D1⊗ D2. For condition (2), consider a one-step formula in 1MLΛ1⊗Λ2(A)
of the form ♥λpi where λ ∈ Λ1 or λ ∈ Λ2. Suppose the former is the case. Then there is a
formula δ ∈ D1(PA) such that such that ♥λpi ≡1 δ[∧A]. But then δ ∧ > ∈ (D1 ⊗ D2)(A), and
this formula is also one-step equivalent to ♥λpi.
Finally, for condition (3), by rewriting positive one-step formulas into disjunctive normal
form (treating modalities as atomic) we only need to consider conjunctions of the form:
(δ1 ∧ δ2) ∧ (δ′1 ∧ δ′2)
where δ1 ∈ D1(A), δ2 ∈ D2(A), δ′1 ∈ D1(B), δ′2 ∈ D2(B). Apply the distributive law of D1 to
δ1∧δ′1 and that of D2 to δ2∧δ′2 to find formulas γ1 ∈ D1(A×B) and γ2 ∈ D2(A×B) such that
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δ1 ∧ δ′1 ≡1 γ1[θA,B] and δ2 ∧ δ′2 ≡1 γ2[θA,B]. The conjunction γ1 ∧ γ2 is in (D1 ⊗ D2)(A×B)
and we have:
(δ1 ∧ δ2) ∧ (δ′1 ∧ δ′2) ≡1 (γ1 ∧ γ2)[θA,B]
as required.
8.3. Composition. The third and final example that we consider involves the composition
T = T1 ◦ T2 of two set functors T1 and T2. We first recall Cˆırstea & Pattinson’s definition
of the combined signature in the case of composition [5].
Definition 8.5. Let λ ∈ Λ1 be an m-ary predicate lifting, and let α1, . . . , αm be one-step
formulas in 1MLΛ2(A) for some set A = {a1, . . . , an}. Then we define the n-ary predicate
lifting
λ〈α1, . . . , αm〉 : P˘n ⇒ P˘T
in the obvious way:
λ〈α1, . . . , αm〉S : (U1, . . . , Un) 7→ λT2S
(
α̂1S(U1, . . . , Un), . . . , α̂mS(U1, . . . , Un)
)
.
We let Λ1 } Λ2 denote the set of all (finitary) predicate liftings that can be obtained in this
way.
In the sequel we will often abbreviate Λ1 } Λ2 as Λ.
Theorem 8.4. Suppose both signatures Λ1 and Λ2 admit a disjunctive basis. Then so does
Λ1 } Λ2.
For the definition of the disjunctive basis of the combined signature, fix a set A =
{a1, . . . , an} and consider the one-step language 1MLΛ1(1MLΛ2(A)). Given a formula α in
this language, every occurrence of an m-ary Λ1-modality ♥λ is of the form ♥λ(γ1, . . . , γm)
with each γi ∈ 1MLΛ2(A). If we now replace each such subformula ♥λ(γ1, . . . , γm) with the
formula ♥λ〈γ1,...,γm〉(a1, . . . , an), we have associated with α a unique formula α′ ∈ 1MLΛ(A).
Definition 8.6. Define
(D1 } D2)(A) := {δ′ ∈ 1MLΛ(A) | δ ∈ D1(D2(A))}.
where D1 and D2 are disjunctive bases for Λ1 and Λ2, respectively.
To prove that D1 } D2 is a disjunctive basis for the signature Λ1 } Λ2 we first show that
D1 } D2(A) consists of disjunctive formulas, for any set A.
Proposition 8.5. Every formula in D1 } D2(A) is disjunctive.
Proof. It suffices to show that for an arbitrary but fixed formula δ ∈ D1(D2(A)), the formula
δ′ ∈ (D1 } D2)(A) is disjunctive.
Let (S, σ,m) be an arbitrary one-step T-model such that S, σ,m 1 δ1, and let δ ∈ D1(B)
and η : B → D2(A) be such that δ = δ1[η]. Consider the one-step T1-model (T2S, σ,mη)
where mη : T2S → PB is given by
mη(ρ) := {b ∈ B | (S, ρ,m) 1 η(b)}.
Unravelling the definitions, it is not hard to show that for any formula α1 ∈ 1MLΛ1(B)
we have
(S, σ,m) 1 α1[η] iff (T2S, σ,mη) 1 α1, (8.2)
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and as an immediate consequence of this we find that
(T2, σ,mη) 1 δ1.
Then by disjunctiveness of D1 there is a one-step T1-model (Z, ζ, n), where ζ ∈ T1Z and
n : Z → P(B), together with a map f : Z → T2S such that (T1f)ζ = σ; |n(z)| ≤ 1 and
n(z) ⊆ mη(f(z)), for all z ∈ Z; and (Z, ζ, n) 1 δ1.
Define, for z ∈ Z, ηz ∈ D(A) to be the formula η(b) in case b ∈ B is the unique element
of n(z); and set ηz := > if n(z) = ∅. Observe that for any z ∈ Z, the triple (S, f(z),m)
constitutes a T2-model; we claim that
(S, f(z),m) 1 ηz. (8.3)
To see this, clearly we only have to pay attention to the case where n(z) = {b} for some
b ∈ B. But here it is immediate from n(z) ⊆ mη(f(z)) that b ∈ mη(f(z)), and so we
obtain (8.3) by definition of mη.
Given (8.3), we now use the disjunctiveness of D2 to obtain, for each z ∈ Z, a one-
step T2-model (Sz, ρz,mz), with ρz ∈ T2Sz and mz : Sz → P(A), together with a map
gz : Sz → S, such that (T2gz)(ρz) = f(z); |mz| ≤ 1 and mz(t) ⊆ m(f(t)), for all t ∈ Sz; and
(Sz, ρz,mz) 1 ηz.
We are now ready to define the required separating cover for (S, σ,m). As its domain
we will take the coproduct
∐
z∈Z Sz, and where for z ∈ Z we let iz : Sz → S′ denote the
insertion map, we define the maps m′ : S′ → PA and g : S′ → S via co-tupling; in particular,
we require m ◦ iz = mz and g ◦ iz = gz for all z ∈ Z. For the definition of the distinguished
element σ′ ∈ TS′, we first define the map ρ′ : Z → T2S′ by setting ρ′(z) := (T2iz)ρz. We
then put σ′ := (T1ρ′)ζ.
It is obvious that (S′, σ′,m) is a one-step T-model; we now check that together with
the map g : S′ → S is indeed a separating cover for (S, σ,m). First of all, it is obvious that
|m′(s′)| ≤ 1 and m′(z) ⊆ m(g(z)), for all s′ ∈ S′. Second, to check that
(Tg)σ′ = σ (8.4)
we first observe that (T2g) ◦ ρ′ = f , as can easily verified: ((T2g) ◦ ρ′)(z) = (T2g)(ρ′(z)) =
(T2g)((T2iz)ρz) = (T2(g ◦ iz))(ρz) = (T2gz)(ρz) = f(z). We then continue with the following
calculation:
(Tg)σ′ = (T1T2g)((T1ρ′)ζ) = ((T1T2g) ◦ (T1ρ′))(ζ) = (T1((T2g) ◦ ρ′))(ζ) = (T1f)(ζ) = σ.
Finally, we need to prove that
(S′, σ′,m′) 1 δ′. (8.5)
To see this, let m′η : T2S′ → PB be the marking given by
m′η(ρ
′) := {b ∈ B | (S′, ρ′,m′) 1 η(b)},
and consider the marking n′ : Z → PB defined by n′(z) := m′η(ρ′z). Our key claim is now
that n ⊆ n′, and we prove this as follows. In case n(z) = ∅ there is nothing to prove; in
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case n(z) 6= ∅, let b ∈ B be the unique element of n(z). Then we have
b ∈ n(z)⇒ b ∈ mη(f(z)) (assumptions on f and n)
⇒ (S, f(z),m) 1 η(b) (definition mη)
⇒ (Sz, ρz,mz) 1 η(b) ((Sz, ρz,mz) is cover)
⇒ (S′, ρ′z,m′) 1 η(b) (invariance under iz, Prop. 2.1)
⇒ b ∈ m′η(ρ′z) (definition m′η)
⇒ b ∈ n′(z) (definition n′)
But by the monotonicity of disjunctive formulas, it follows from n ⊆ n′ and (Z, ζ, n) 1 δ1
that (Z, ζ, n′) 1 δ1. Then by invariance (Proposition 2.1) we find that (T2S, σ,m′η) 1 δ1,
and from this we may derive (8.5), using an analogous claim to (8.2).
Proof of Theorem 8.4. Since we have verified the disjunctivity of all formulas in D1 }
D2(A), it remains to check that D1 } D2(A) satisfies the closure conditions of disjunctive
bases. For condition (1) this is an immediate consequence of the definitions. It is in fact not
very hard to see that D1 } D2 meets the other two closure conditions as well, but full proofs
are very tedious. In order to avoid convoluted syntax we confine ourselves to somewhat
sketchy arguments here.
For condition (2), consider a formula of the form ♥λ〈α1,...,αm〉(b1, . . . , bn)[pi], where
λ ∈ Λ1, each αi ∈ 1MLΛ2(B) and pi : B → Latt(A). Since D1 is a disjunctive basis
for Λ1, we may find formulas δ1 ∈ D1({1, . . . , k}) and β1, . . . , βk ∈ 1MLΛ2(A) such that
♥λ(α1[pi], . . . , αm[pi]) ≡1 δ1(β1, . . . , βk). But, now using the fact that D2 is a disjunctive
basis for Λ2, we may derive from Proposition 3.2 that each formula βi is equivalent to a
formula γi[∧A], where γi ∈ D2(PA). It is then a tedious but straightforward exercise to show
that ♥λ〈α1,...,αm〉(b1, . . . , bn)[pi] ≡1 δ′, where we define δ := δ1(γ1, . . . , γk).
Finally, for condition (3), consider two disjunctive formulas γ′ ∈ D1 } D2(A) and δ′ ∈
D1 } D2(B), where γ = γ1[σ] and δ = δ1[τ ] for γ1 ∈ D1(A′), δ1 ∈ D1(B′), and σ : A′ → D2(A),
τ : B′ → D2(B) for some sets A′ and B′ that without loss of generality we may take
to be disjoint. D1 being a disjunctive basis yields a formula β1 ∈ D(A′ ∪× B′) such that
γ1 ∧ δ1 ≡1 β1[θA′,B′ ]. By the disjointness of A′ and B′ we then have
γ′ ∧ δ′ ≡1 β1[θA′,B′ ][σ][τ ]. (8.6)
Now consider an arbitrary pair (a′, b′) ∈ A′ × B′; since D2 is a disjunctive basis there is a
formula αa′,b′ ∈ D2(A×B) such that σa′∧τb′ ≡1 αa′,b′ [θA,B ]. Define the following substitution
σ ∪× τ : A′ ∪× B′ → D2(A′ ∪× B′):
σ ∪× τ(d) :=

σ(d) if d ∈ A′
τ(d) if d ∈ B′
αa′,b′ if d = (a
′, b′) ∈ A′ ×B′
It then follows from the definitions that the substitutions [θA′,B′ ][σ][τ ] and [σ ∪× τ ][θA,B]
produce one-step equivalent formulas, so that combining this with (8.6) we obtain that
γ′ ∧ δ′ ≡1 β1[σ ∪× τ ][θA,B].
This suffices, since obviously we have that β1[σ ∪× τ ] ∈ D1 } D2(A ∪× B).
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9. Yoneda representation of disjunctive liftings
It is a well known fact in coalgebraic modal logic that predicate liftings have a neat
representation via an application of the Yoneda lemma. This was explored by Schro¨der
in [32], where it was used among other things to prove a characterization theorem for the
monotone predicate liftings. Here, we apply the same idea to disjunctive liftings. We shall
be working with a slightly generalized notion of predicate lifting here, taking a predicate
lifting over a finite set of variables A to be a natural transformation λ : P˘A → P˘ ◦T. Clearly,
one-step formulas in 1MLΛ(A) can then be viewed as predicate liftings over A.
Definition 9.1. Let λ : P˘A → P˘ ◦ T be a predicate lifting over variables A = {a1, . . . , an}.
The Yoneda representation y(λ) of λ is the subset
λPA(truea1 , . . . , truean) ∈ PTPA
where trueai = {B ⊆ A | ai ∈ B}. We shall write simply λ ⊆ TPA instead of y(λ).
Definition 9.2. Given a set A, let A> be the set A ∪ {>}. Let A ⊆ A> × PA be the
relation defined by aAB iff a ∈ B, and >AB for all B ⊆ A. Let ηA : A> → PA be defined
by ηA(a) = {a}, and ηA(>) = ∅.
In the remainder of this section we assume familiarity with the Barr relation lifting T
associated with a functor T; see [21] for the definition and some basic properties.
Definition 9.3. A predicate lifting λ ⊆ TPA is said to be divisible if, for all α ∈ λ there is
some β ∈ TA> such that (β, α) ∈ T(A) and TηA(β) ∈ λ.
Proposition 9.1. Any disjunctive lifting over A is divisible, and if T preserves weak
pullbacks the disjunctive liftings over A are precisely the divisible ones.
Proof. Suppose λ ⊆ TPA is disjunctive, and pick α ∈ λ. Then PA,α, idPA 1 λ, so since λ is
disjunctive there are some one-step model (X, ξ,m) and map f : X → PA with m : X → PA,
m(u) ⊆ f(u) for all u ∈ X, Tf(ξ) = α, and |m(u)| ≤ 1 for all u ∈ X. We define a map
g : X → A> by setting g : u 7→ > if m(u) = ∅, g : u 7→ a if m(u) = {a}. We tuple the
maps f, g to get a map 〈f, g〉 : X → A> × PA. In fact, since m(u) ⊆ f(u) for all u ∈ X, we
have 〈f, g〉 : X → A. Let pi1 : A → A> and pi2 : A → PA be the projection maps. We
have the following diagram, in which the two triangles and the outer edges commute (i.e.,
m = ηA ◦ g).
PA
X
m //
f
77
g
&&
〈f,g〉
// A
pi2
OO
pi1

A>
ηA
ff
Now apply T to this diagram and define β ∈ TA> to be T(pi1 ◦ 〈f, g〉)(ξ) = Tg(ξ). First,
we have (β, α) ∈ T(A), witnessed by T(〈f, g〉)(ξ) ∈ TA. We claim that TηA(β) ∈ λ.
But since X, ξ,m 1 λ and m = ηA ◦ g, naturality of λ applied to the map g : X →
A>, gives A>, β, ηA 1 λ. Another naturality argument, applied to ηA : (A>, β, ηA) →
(PA,TηA(β), idPA) gives PA,TηA(β), idPA 1 λ, i.e., TηA(β) ∈ λ.
For the converse direction, under the assumption that T preserves weak pullbacks,
suppose that λ is divisible, and suppose X, ξ,m 1 λ. We get Tm(ξ) ∈ λ and so we find some
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β ∈ TA> with β(TA)Tm(ξ) and TηA(β) ∈ λ. Pick some β′ ∈ TA with Tpi2(β′) = Tm(ξ)
and Tpi1(β
′) = β. Let R, g1, g2 be the pullback of the diagram X → PA← A, shown in the
diagram:
X
m // PA
R
g1
OO
g2
// A
pi2
OO
pi1

A>
ηA
ff
By weak pullback preservation there is ρ ∈ TR with Tg1(ρ) = ξ and Tg2(ρ) = β′.
The map g1 : (R, ρ) → (X, ξ) is thus a cover, and we have a marking m′ on R defined by
ηA ◦ pi1 ◦ g2 (follow the bottom-right path in the previous diagram). It is now routine to
check that R, ρ,m′ 1 λ, and |m′(u)| ≤ 1 and m′(u) ⊆ m(g1(u)) for all u ∈ R, so we are
done.
For the moment, we leave the question open, whether a similar characterization of
disjunctive predicate liftings can be proved without weak pullback preservation. We also
leave it as an open problem to characterize the functors that admit a disjunctive basis.
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